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The World Economy
Temporary slowdown in world economic growth
The world economy, which initially had expanded at an exceptionally
dynamic pace, lost momentum over the course of 2004. The growth rate
slowed in the USA, in particular, where the economy had previously been
on an extremely robust upward trajectory, and it also slowed in Asia. In the
European Union, the pace of expansion remained only modest.
The main factor behind the slower pace of world growth was the tight-
ening of the economic policy reins. Although the monetary conditions con-
tinued to stimulate growth in the USA, a more restrictive monetary policy
stance was adopted, and as the impetus exerted by fiscal policy abated, the
impact of economic policy was less expansive than in 2003. The measures
adopted in China in an endeavour to steer the overheated economy into
calmer waters appear to be succeeding. And the sharp increase in the price
of oil also curbed world economic growth. 
However, the price thrust caused by the rise in oil prices did not lead to
supplementary wage demands; there is thus no reason to expect second-
round effects that would provoke a counter-reaction from monetary policy.
On the DIW Berlin's view, the situation on the crude oil markets suggests
that the price growth will soon ease off. It is assumed in this forecast that
the price of oil will decline over the forecast period and amount to an aver-
age US $ 33 per barrel (North Sea Brent) in 2005 and 2006.1
Subsequent to the momentary slowdown, the world economy will gradu-
ally strengthen again over the forecast period. While the pace of expansion
will be somewhat slower in the USA, where private consumer spending will
increase less rapidly and the savings ratio will therefore rise slightly, in
Europe, by contrast, the forces for economic growth will become stronger as
time goes on. The pace of growth will diminish in Asia, though it will still
remain robust (cf. tables 1 and 2).
There are various risks, however. These include, in particular, the
exchange-rate trend for the US dollar against the world's most important
1  For the impact on economic growth of changes in the price of oil, cf. 'Economic Trends 2004/
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Table 1
Real GDP, Consumer Prices and Unemployment Rate in Selected Countries
Weight
(%)
GDP Consumer prices1 Unemployment rate2




2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006
Germany 8.7 – 1.8 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.4 9.6 9.5 8.6
France 6.4 13.1 2.2 2.1 2.5 2.3 1.8 1.6 9.5 9.4 9.2
Italy 5.3 9.2 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.2 2.2 1.8 8.4 8.2 8.1
Spain 3.0 6.1 2.6 2.6 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.4 10.8 10.3 10.1
Netherlands 1.9 7.7 1.2 1.4 2.2 1.4 1.4 1.2 4.7 4.7 4.4
Belgium 1.1 6.3 2.7 2.5 2.6 1.9 2.1 1.8 7.8 7.9 7.7
Austria 0.9 6.6 1.8 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.6 1.2 4.5 4.4 4.1
Greece 0.6 1.0 4.0 1.5 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.6 9.2 9.5 9.4
Finland 0.6 1.3 3.1 3.3 3.0 0.2 1.6 1.5 8.9 8.6 8.5
Ireland 0.6 0.7 5.5 4.0 4.1 2.3 1.9 2.2 4.5 4.2 4.1
Portugal 0.5 1.2 1.2 1.3 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.3 6.6 6.7 6.5
Luxembourg 0.1 0.6 3.5 4.0 4.2 3.2 3.2 2.5 4.2 4.2 4.0
EMU countries3 29.7 – 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.1 2.1 1.7 8.9 8.7 8.3
EMU countries excl. Germany3 21.0 – 2.1 2.1 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.8 8.5 8.4 8.2
EMU countries excl. Germany4 – 5 3 . 82 . 02 . 12 . 42 . 12 . 01 . 7 – – –
Great Britain 6.5 10.4 3.2 3.0 2.7 1.6 1.8 1.9 4.9 4.9 4.9
Sweden 1.1 2.7 3.5 3.0 2.6 1.2 1.8 1.9 6.2 5.9 5.2
Denmark 0.8 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.2 1.6 1.7 1.9 5.7 5.3 5.0
EU-153 38.0 – 2.3 2.2 2.4 1.9 1.6 1.7 8.0 7.9 7.6
Poland 0.8 3.1 5.4 3.5 4.3 3.8 4.3 2.7 18.8 18.3 18.0
Czech Republic 0.3 3.1 3.6 4.0 4.5 2.7 1.8 1.8 8.4 8.3 8.0
Hungary 0.3 2.2 4.0 3.5 4.2 6.8 5.1 4.0 5.9 6.2 5.9
Slovakia 0.1 1.0 5.4 5.2 4.6 7.5 3.0 2.5 18.1 17.4 17.0
Slovenia 0.1 0.5 4.6 4.2 4.3 3.5 2.8 2.7 6.0 5.8 5.6
Lithuania 0.1 0.3 6.6 7.9 7.5 1.2 3.5 3.2 10.9 9.7 9.2
Cyprus 0.0 0.1 3.8 3.7 4.3 2.0 2.5 2.5 5.0 5.2 4.8
Latvia 0.0 0.2 8.5 7.5 7.8 6.2 5.8 5.0 9.8 9.5 9.0
Estonia 0.0 0.1 6.2 6.0 5.7 2.9 3.0 2.7 9.2 8.0 7.7
Malta 0.0 0.1 1.0 1.5 1.8 2.7 2.0 1.8 7.3 6.9 6.8
EU-253 39.8 – 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.0 2.0 1.8 9.0 8.9 8.5
Switzerland 1.2 4.9 1.5 1.8 1.8 0.4 0.8 0.8 4.2 3.8 3.6
Norway 0.8 0.8 3.3 2.8 2.5 0.5 1.8 2.0 4.3 4.1 4.0
Western and central Europe3 41.8 – 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.0 1.9 1.7 8.9 8.7 8.4
USA 39.6 11.6 4.4 3.4 3.1 2.7 2.7 2.3 5.5 5.1 4.9
Japan 15.6 2.2 2.9 1.5 2.6 –0.2 0.0 0.1 4.7 4.5 4.3
Canada 3.1 0.9 3.0 3.4 3.2 1.8 1.9 1.8 7.1 6.9 6.8
Non-European industrial countries3 58.2 – 3.9 2.8 3.0 1.9 2.0 1.7 5.4 5.0 4.9
Non-European industrial countries4 – 1 4 . 74 . 13 . 13 . 02 . 22 . 31 . 9 – – –
Total3 100.0 – 3.3 2.6 2.8 1.9 2.0 1.7 7.1 6.8 6.6
Total excl. Germany3 91.3 – 3.4 2.7 2.8 1.9 2.0 1.7 6.8 6.5 6.4
Memo item: Total weighted by exports4 – 100.0 2.8 2.6 2.7 2.2 2.1 1.8 – – –
1 EU-15 and Norway: harmonised index of consumer prices. — 2 Standardised. — 3 Total of countries listed. GDP and consumer prices weighted by 2003 GDP in US dollars;
unemployment rate weighted by 2003 labour force. — 4 Total of countries listed. Weighted by country's shares in German exports 2003.
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook; Eurostat; National Accounts; national statistics and DIW Berlin calculations; 2004 to 2006: DIW Berlin estimate and prognosis.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 1/2005 3
Table 2
Trends in GDP Components in Selected Countries







2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006
Germany –0.3 0.9 1.1 –0.4 0.2 1.0 –0.3 2.0 3.2 9.4 5.7 5.2 7.9 4.7 4.5
France 2.1 2.0 2.4 2.5 1.8 1.9 2.8 3.5 4.0 3.2 4.4 4.7 7.5 4.4 3.9
Italy 1.2 1.4 1.8 0.4 0.8 1.2 2.6 3.1 3.3 4.2 6.3 4.3 2.9 5.5 4.8
Spain 3.3 2.9 3.0 4.3 4.0 4.1 4.3 3.5 2.9 5.5 8.5 5.5 9.3 9.1 5.2
Netherlands 0.1 0.7 1.7 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.8 4.0 6.3 5.7 4.6 5.3 5.2 4.5
Belgium 2.2 2.5 2.7 3.0 2.5 2.3 4.3 4.4 4.7 5.4 7.2 5.4 6.8 7.8 5.7
Austria 1.4 2.2 2.6 0.2 0.6 0.8 1.3 3.4 4.1 6.9 5.0 4.2 5.2 4.5 4.1
Finland 2.5 2.7 2.6 1.0 1.4 1.6 4.9 4.0 4.1 2.4 4.2 4.3 0.7 4.4 5.0
Greece 3.5 3.5 3.0 0.2 –0.5 0.5 6.0 –3.0 4.0 3.8 3.5 3.5 3.1 2.5 3.0
Portugal 2.3 2.1 2.4 0.8 0.8 0.7 2.1 1.5 2.6 6.1 3.2 4.6 7.3 2.2 3.2
Ireland 2.3 2.0 2.9 3.4 4.1 4.1 8.2 7.3 5.3 5.2 8.3 10.6 2.2 11.5 12.4
Luxembourg 3.0 3.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 3.0 7.0 8.0 8.0 5.7 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.5 6.5
EMU countries1,2 1.1 1.7 2.0 1.4 1.3 1.6 1.6 2.9 3.7 6.2 5.8 5.0 6.5 5.5 4.6
EMU countries 
excl. Germany1,2 1.9 2.0 2.3 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.8 3.1 3.7 4.8 5.9 4.9 5.9 5.8 4.7
Great Britain 3.1 2.7 2.3 4.6 3.5 2.9 6.2 4.0 2.5 2.1 4.0 2.6 4.4 3.6 2.5
Sweden 2.5 3.0 3.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.5 6.0 6.0 9.5 7.5 6.0 6.0 8.0 6.5
Denmark 3.2 3.0 2.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.3 3.5 3.0 5.5 5.0 4.5 6.0 5.5 4.5
EU-151 1.7 1.9 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.8 2.8 3.0 3.5 5.8 5.6 4.7 6.1 5.3 4.4
Poland 3.7 3.8 4.6 –0.3 –0.2 0.3 3.8 4.8 7.5 7.0 4.6 6.4 5.8 6.6 7.8
Czech Republic 2.7 3.5 4.0 –3.0 –1.1 1.4 9.7 7.1 5.0 20.1 7.5 6.0 18.3 6.7 5.4
Hungary 4.0 3.5 3.9 –0.8 0.6 1.4 11.5 6.0 5.0 13.1 6.5 6.4 14.6 5.8 5.9
Slovakia 3.5 4.0 4.1 0.7 2.7 3.6 4.1 5.5 5.8 10.0 7.0 8.7 11.9 6.6 7.8
Slovenia 3.6 4.1 4.4 1.5 2.2 2.8 6.4 4.9 5.7 11.5 6.2 5.5 11.0 5.9 4.9
Lithuania 8.8 7.7 8.0 3.1 4.7 5.5 11.8 9.5 8.2 4.7 9.0 8.3 12.8 7.2 6.5
Cyprus 4.4 4.1 4.5 4.0 2.4 4.1 11.9 5.6 6.0 5.9 4.3 4.8 10.1 2.9 5.0
Latvia 8.8 8.0 8.2 2.8 4.8 5.0 19.6 15.3 9.7 7.8 9.1 9.2 16.4 9.7 9.5
Estonia 6.3 6.2 6.1 4.7 4.9 4.9 7.6 8.0 8.2 19.8 9.7 8.7 16.4 9.1 8.2
Malta 0.5 1.2 1.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 6.0 2.0 1.0 1.8 2.8 2.8 1.5 2.5 2.5
EU-251 1.8 2.0 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.7 3.0 3.2 3.6 6.2 5.7 4.8 6.6 5.4 4.5
Switzerland 1.5 1.8 1.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.0 3.0 2.5 5.0 5.5 4.5 6.0 6.3 5.2
Norway 4.9 4.5 3.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.5 3.0 2.5 4.5 4.5 4.0 5.8 6.0 5.0
Europe1 1.8 2.0 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.7 3.0 3.2 3.5 6.1 5.6 4.8 6.5 5.4 4.6
USA 3.7 3.1 2.6 1.9 2.9 3.0 9.2 7.6 6.0 8.7 6.8 6.7 10.1 7.8 6.6
Japan 1.9 1.8 2.6 2.4 –0.3 –0.3 2.0 2.1 3.7 14.0 4.5 6.5 8.5 6.4 5.8
Canada 3.3 3.2 3.1 2.8 3.2 3.2 6.2 5.5 4.7 7.7 7.0 5.8 8.4 9.3 6.5
Non-European
industrial countries1 3.2 2.8 2.6 2.1 2.0 2.1 6.7 5.8 5.2 10.0 6.2 6.5 9.6 7.7 6.4
Total1 2.7 2.5 2.5 1.9 1.8 1.9 5.2 4.7 4.5 7.4 5.8 5.3 7.7 6.3 5.3
Total excl. Germany1 3.0 2.7 2.6 2.1 1.9 2.0 5.7 4.9 4.6 7.0 5.8 5.3 7.6 6.5 5.4
1 2003 weights on dollar basis at 2003 exchange rates (annual average); exports and imports: weighted average of the countries concerned. — 2 Exports and imports incl.
intra-EMU trade.
Sources: OECD Economic Outlook; Eurostat; National Accounts; national statistics and DIW Berlin calculations; 2004 to 2006: DIW Berlin estimate and prognosis.4 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 1/2005
currencies and also the trend for the price of oil. The
USA's high and still-rising current account deficit is
being monitored with concern on the financial markets.
Resulting portfolio restructuring has reinforced the
upward pressure on the euro and in itself constitutes a
burden on the competitiveness of European exporters.
This forecast is based on the assumption that the euro/
dollar exchange rate will remain fixed at just over
US $ 1.30 per euro. In other words, the upward trend
will come to a halt during the forecast period. One of the
important factors behind this development are improved
capital market yields as interest rates rise. Moreover, the
US dollar has already appreciated substantially in
recent years _ by a hefty 20% in nominal effective terms
over the last two years. This has substantially increased
the competitiveness of US enterprises, although the
improvement has not yet been reflected in the current
account. Experience has shown, however, that a cur-
rency depreciation initially has a negative effect on the
foreign trade position because import prices adjust more
quickly than the volume of goods exported can be
expanded. Taking this effect into consideration, the US
current account deficit is likely to fall over the medium
term as a share of GDP by about 1 percentage point on
the current figure.
The oil-price trend poses another risk. The DIW Ber-
lin believes that the current oil price is still excessive in
that it is based in part on speculative activity and is
therefore not in line with its fundamental determinants.
Given that there is adequate capacity, that stocks have
increased and that the pace of world economic growth
has slowed, the authors believe that the boom will come
to an end and that the price of crude oil will decline
again. If, however, there is renewed speculation or if,
indeed, productive activities were to be significantly
impeded by terrorist attacks, then the recovery of the
world economy would be jeopardised.2
Weaker momentum in Asia
Asia is currently one of the regions experiencing the
strongest pace of overall economic growth (cf. table 3).3
However, the rate of expansion has recently slowed in
this part of the world. This also applies to Japan, where
output almost stagnated in the summer of 2004.4 In the
second quarter, GDP actually declined slightly as gov-
ernment investment dropped sharply (cf. figure 1). The
domestic economy has now recovered again to some
extent, however. Both investment and private consump-
tion are expanding, albeit at subdued rates. Domestic
investors are evidently availing of the increasingly open
access to loans. The moderate improvement on the
labour market has clearly boosted consumer confidence.
Exports are rising at only a very restrained pace, how-
ever, as the appreciation of the yen and the weakening
world economy have curtailed demand for Japanese
products.
Consumer prices rose in October on the previous
month; however, when food prices are excluded from the
calculation, consumer prices continue to show a slight
2  In order to estimate the effects of unfavourable exchange-rate and
oil-price trends, the NiGEM model was used to simulate a scenario of
this kind. The results can be viewed in the chapter 'The German Econ-
omy', box 2, page 14.
3  The forecast was drawn up prior to the tsunami disaster of 26
December 2004 and therefore does not give consideration to the conse-
quences of this event.
4  The method used to measure GDP and its components in Japan was
recently significantly revised. The GDP deflator and the way in which
it is constructed were altered very substantially (for details, cf. http://
www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/sna). The new statistical procedure has resulted
in much lower GDP growth rates for the last three years. According to
the 'old' figures, GDP grew at an annual rate of 7.6% in the fourth
quarter of 2003. The revised figures indicate a growth rate of 3.6%.
Thus, the growth rate based on the forecasts to date for 2004 has
diminished substantially.
Table 3





Change (%) on the previous year
2003 2004 2005 2006 2003 2004 2005 2006
Indonesia 7.5 4.5 5.0 4.5 5.0 6.7 6.0 5.5 5.5
Malaysia 4.6 5.3 7.2 6.0 6.0 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.5
Singapore 4.4 1.1 7.8 4.0 4.5 0.5 1.9 1.5 1.5
South Korea 21.8 3.1 5.0 4.5 5.0 3.5 3.7 4.0 4.0
China 61.6 9.1 9.4 8.0 8.5 1.2 4.5 5.0 5.0
South-east Asia1 100.0 6.9 7.9 6.7 7.2 2.1 4.2 4.5 4.5
1 Sum for countries listed. Weights: 2001 GDP in US dollars.
Sources: National and international statistics; DIW Berlin calculations; 2004 to 2006: DIW Berlin estimate and prognosis.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 1/2005 5
decline. The Japanese central bank intends to maintain
its policy of 'easy money' until the deflationary trend
can be considered overcome. Given that the strong yen
tends to exert a downward pressure on prices, there is
no reason to expect a change in monetary policy for the
present.5
Japanese fiscal policy is geared towards pushing for-
ward the consolidation of the public budgets. Up to now,
the restriction of the deficit to around 7% of GDP has
been primarily due to the influence of the automatic sta-
bilisers. Further-reaching measures would be required if
the public sector's deficits are to be reduced more rap-
idly. Whenever more forceful measures have been imple-
mented in the past, however, they have frequently sti-
fled growth. Fiscal policy can at most be expected to
have a slightly restrictive effect over the forecast period.
The Japanese economy will continue to expand over-
all. The first dampening impulse will come from abroad
when the slowdown in overall momentum makes itself
felt in the region. This effect, as well as the effect ema-
nating from the yen's appreciation, will then gradually
abate. The improved level of consumer confidence will
help to maintain private consumption on an upward tra-
jectory. The pace of private-sector investment will accel-
erate over the forecast period, not least because financ-
ing conditions have improved. All in all, GDP will
increase by 1.5% this year and by 2.7% in 2006. At the
same time, the unemployment rate will fall _ though not
until next year _ to an estimated 4.3%. The decline in
consumer prices will ease off over the course of the fore-
cast period.
In China, the economy continued to expand robustly
overall, with GDP increasing between January and Sep-
tember 2004 at a rate of 9.5% compared to the same
period the previous year. The strong momentum is
mainly based on external demand.
The Chinese economy is manifesting some symp-
toms of overheating, however. Inflation has risen signifi-
cantly, and both the energy supply and commodities
have been subject to shortages. Economic policy makers
in China are attempting to react to the overheating. In
fact, the government has decided to restrict the volume
of credit and to raise interest rates. The present forecast
is based on the assumption that this policy will be main-
tained and that China will experience a soft landing over
the course of the forecast period. All in all, the Chinese
economy will grow by 8.0% this year and by 8.5% in
2006.
The remaining Asian emerging countries also
expanded rapidly in 2004. Export growth, which was
robust anyway, was additionally stimulated by a rela-
5  This is a combined policy of zero interest rates and a generous sup-
ply of liquidity for the commercial banking sector.
1 Change (%) on the previous quarter, annualised rate. — 2 Change (%) on the pre-
vious year.
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tively expansive monetary policy stance. As a conse-
quence, both investment and private consumer spending
also showed vigorous growth.
Although these countries will be affected by the
slowdown in China over the forecast period, domestic
factors such as the favourable financing conditions for
investments will have a stabilising effect. Given this
context, the prospects are auspicious for these countries
over the forecast period.
USA: economy enters calmer waters
The pace of overall economic expansion has slowed
down in the USA since the beginning of the year,
although the latest figures for output growth showed an
annual rate of increase of 4%. The pillars that have sup-
ported growth in the USA _ on the latest figures _ have
been a solid upward trend for private consumption and
a substantial increase in private-sector investment in
machinery and software (cf. figure 2), despite the fact
that the strength of the impetus exerted by fiscal policy
has diminished. Government investment and consump-
tion spending also boosted growth last year.
Economic policy in the USA reduced the strength of
its expansive drive last year, although the stance taken
continues to act in support of economic growth. The US
Federal Reserve has gradually raised the Federal Funds
Rate by 1.25 percentage points since the middle of the
year. The short-term interest rate last stood at 2.25%
and was thus still very low when seen in historical per-
spective; short-term interest rates were negative in real
terms, as they already have been for the last three years.
As a result, the expansive impulse exerted by monetary
policy remains substantial. Fiscal policy is also growth
oriented, in particular by way of the after-effects of the
tax reform. Even when these impulses abate, the fiscal
policy course will remain expansive. Government pur-
chases of armaments, in particular, will continue to
exhibit very sizeable growth.
The upward trend in the USA will continue over the
forecast period at a slightly reduced pace (cf. figure 3).
Private consumer spending will expand at a slightly
Sources: BEA; DIW Berlin calculations.
Figure 2
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slower pace than the average in recent years. The sav-
ings ratio of private households is unlikely to decline
any further, rather may increase slightly. In addition,
rising interest rates will curtail investment in housing
construction, which was booming up to summer 2004.
Investment in machinery will also expand at a some-
what slower pace than last year. In addition to rising
interest rates on the capital markets, another factor
behind the slowdown will be the expiry of tax conces-
sions that last year had provided an incentive to bring
forward planned investments to 2004. Employment
growth will proceed at a moderate pace.
As oil prices rose and the US dollar depreciated,
inflation continued to accelerate. The rise in productiv-
ity, which was substantial until only recently, dimin-
ished sharply, however. The result will be a more rapid
rise in unit labour costs and consequently higher cost
pressure on enterprises. As a result, the inflation rate
will decline only slowly. Falling oil prices and the fact
that the US dollar will not depreciate any further over
the forecast period will in themselves have a dampening
effect on price growth.
All in all, GDP will rise by 3.4% in the USA in 2005,
following a 4.4% increase in 2004. Growth is likely to
slow down to some extent (3.1%) in 2006. The inflation
rate will amount to 2.7% this year _ the same figure as
last year _ and will fall to 2.3% in 2006.
1 Change (%) on the previous quarter, annualised rate. — 2 Change (%) on the pre-
vious year.
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Moderate Recovery in the EU
Investment-driven growth 
in the new EU member states
At an annualised rate of 4% in the third quarter of 2004,
growth in the EU's new member states was once again
more dynamic than in the euro zone as a whole,
although the pace was slightly slower than in the second
quarter of the year. The highest growth rates were
recorded in the Baltic countries. The robust growth
rates have been accompanied by a strong increase in
industrial output.
Growth is still primarily driven by domestic
demand. While the growth rates for private consump-
tion declined slightly on trend, most countries are expe-
riencing an investment boom based both on foreign
direct investment and on infrastructure projects. Several
countries showed double-digit year-on growth rates for
real capital investments. Export growth slowed down in
the third quarter, although the rates of expansion
remained strong. This development was probably not
only related to the high oil price and the weaker pace of
world economic growth, but was also determined by the
exchange-rate trends. The currencies of some countries
have appreciated in nominal terms in recent months.
This was most evident in Poland, where the zloty has
appreciated by almost 10% against the euro since the
beginning of 2004. The rise in imports was weaker in
the third quarter than in the second. The reason was the
tendency to anticipate purchases from abroad in
advance of the harmonisation of the external tariffs in
the EU _ this effect led to a rise in imports in the second
quarter of the year, especially those from non-EU coun-
tries. The enlargement of the EU led to an overall shift
in trade flows because the accession countries are now
increasingly importing goods and services from the 'old'
member states. Except in just a few cases, the result has
been a substantial deterioration in the trade balance of
these countries against the old member states, while the
balance against non-EU countries has improved.
The high growth rates contributed in the Baltic
countries, in particular, to a decline in the unemploy-
ment rate; nonetheless, unemployment in the new mem-
ber states still frequently exceeds the EU average. In the
central European countries, employment rose only mar-
ginally, if at all. The strong growth rates are still princi-
pally the result of strong productivity growth.
Inflation rates rose sharply in all countries over the
course of 2004, largely because of adjustments in indi-
rect taxes and regulated prices, and also because of the
oil-price rise. Country-specific determinants such as the
unexpected price hikes for foodstuffs in Poland and the
strong economy in Latvia were an additional factor.
Growth in the new member states will continue to
exceed the EU average over the forecast period. How-
ever, 2005 will bring a temporary slowdown, especially
in Poland, where the sharp appreciation of the zloty will
curb export growth. Private consumption will be cur-
tailed by the persisting strained situation on the labour
market; moreover, the restrictive monetary policy stance
maintained in 2004 will impede a more robust recovery
in investments. The other new member states will grow
at much the same pace as before. The Baltic states, in
particular, will face the risk of high and rising current
account deficits. The Latvian economy is threatening to
overheat.6 In Hungary, more intense efforts to consoli-
date the public budget and a reduction in the current
account deficit could become necessary over the forecast
period, and this would result in greater losses in growth.
All in all, real GDP in the new member states can be
expected to show a weighted increase of 4% in 2005 and
of 4.5% in 2006.
After a temporary further increase in inflation rates
at the beginning of 2005, the rise in prices will become
noticeably weaker. Having increased by 4.2% in 2004,
prices will rise by 3.7% in 2005 and by 2.8% in 2006.
Unemployment rates will decline only slightly. The Bal-
tic countries will be the exception in this regard: here,
the high growth rates will go hand in hand with a per-
ceptible decline in unemployment.
Euro zone: 
temporary slowdown in growth
The third quarter of 2004 also saw a weakening of
growth in the euro zone; real GDP rose at an annualised
rate of 2.2% on the previous quarter, following a 2.0%
increase in the second quarter of the year. The main rea-
son was the deterioration in the external conditions, in
particular the appreciation of the euro against the US
dollar and the renewed increase in the price of oil (cf. fig-
ure 4). 
Growth in the third quarter was boosted by domestic
demand, which showed an increase of 4.4% on the pre-
vious quarter. Without taking account of the build-up of
stocks, this amounts to an increase of 1.6% _ the highest
6   In addition, in preparation for participation in the ERM II exchange-
rate mechanism, at the beginning of 2005 the Latvian lat's exchange-
rate peg to the Special Drawing Rights basket of currencies will be
switched to the euro as anchor currency. In recent months, as the US
dollar has depreciated, the lat has also depreciated in nominal terms
against the euro; this has limited the negative impact of the higher
inflation rate on the real exchange rate against the euro zone. The sta-
bilisation of the exchange rate from January 2005 onwards could thus
further exacerbate Latvia's negative foreign trade balance.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 1/2005 9
since the beginning of 2003. While private consumption
rose only very moderately, capital investments (espe-
cially investment in machinery) increased relatively
robustly. Stock-building, which was related to the sub-
stantial expansion of imports, contributed significantly
to the growth rate. The external balance was markedly
negative in the third quarter, and the rise in imports was
thrice as high as that for exports. The foreign trade bal-
ance _ calculated in nominal terms _ also deteriorated
perceptibly in the third quarter. This was due only to a
minor extent to the trade balance with the USA; the
trade deficit with the oil-exporting countries and with
China increased, by contrast. The trade gap with China
is now almost of the same magnitude as the trade sur-
plus with the USA.
Employment rose slightly in the euro zone in the
third quarter of the year. The unemployment rate
remained unchanged at almost 9%. As a result of the
more robust rate of economic growth in 2004 and the
extremely moderate rate of wage growth, the increase in
unit labour costs slowed down perceptibly.
Inflation amounted to 2.4% in October 2004; it has
exceeded the European Central Bank's reference value of
2% since the middle of the year. The renewed rise in the
rate of inflation is mainly a consequence of the higher
prices for energy and of administrative measures such
as increases in indirect taxes and duties.
In addition to the European Commission's leading
indicator for growth, the confidence indicators and
industrial output, especially, also suggest that growth
has picked up once again in the euro zone. GDP growth
amounted to 2.0% for 2004 as a whole, and this figure
also corresponds to the growth in domestic demand.
The repercussions of the high oil price and the tem-
porary slowdown in world economic expansion will cur-
tail growth to some extent over the coming months.
Growth will be largely borne by domestic demand in
2005. The relatively favourable earnings expectations in
the euro zone will facilitate a noticeable rise in invest-
ment. While private consumption will increase only
moderately, it will do so at higher rates than previously.
Real GDP is likely to rise in the euro zone in 2005 by an
average 2%; a somewhat higher increase (2.4%) can be
expected in 2006 in view of the foreseeable stronger rate
of world economic expansion (cf. table 4).
The harmonised price index will rise by an annual
average 2.1% in 2005 and by 1.7% the following year.
The rise will mainly be a consequence of energy price
growth. Prices will not be subject to any pressure from
wage growth, and second-round effects based on the oil-
price rise are unlikely. Unit labour costs can be expected
to rise by about 1%. Next year, the increase is likely to
be somewhat sharper, rising to an annual average of
1.5%. Employment will remain on a growth trajectory
over the next two years, but the increase will not be
strong enough to reduce the unemployment rate to any
Figure 4
Real GDP in the Euro Zone
Seasonally adjusted
1 Change (%) on the previous quarter, annualised rate (right-hand scale). —
2 Change (%) on the previous year.






























EMU Countries: Key Forecast Figures
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Change (%) on the previous year
Real GDP 0.8 0.5 2.0 2.0 2.4
Private consumption 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.7 2.0
Government consumption 3.0 2.0 1.4 1.3 1.6
Gross fixed capital formation –2.8 –0.5 1.6 2.9 3.7
Construction –1.9 –0.5 0.5 1.6 3.1
Machinery and other equipment –3.7 –0.5 2.6 4.2 4.5
External surplus/deficit1 0.5 –0.7 0.1 0.2 0.2
Consumer prices2 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.7
Unit labour costs 2.3 2.2 0.8 1.0 1.3
As % of nominal GDP
Budget surplus/deficit3 –2.2 –2.7 –2.9 –2.6 –2.4
Current account balance 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.0
As % of labour force
Unemployment rate4 8.4 8.9 8.9 8.7 8.3
1 Contribution to GDP growth. — 2 Harmonised index of consumer prices. —
3 Total government surplus/deficit. — 4 Standardised.
Sources: National and international statistics; DIW Berlin calculations; 2004 to
2006: DIW Berlin estimate and prognosis.10 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 1/2005
conspicuous extent; it will amount to an average 8.7%
this year and an average 8.3% in 2006.
Fiscal policy in the euro zone:
slightly restrictive stance
The public budgets in the euro zone were somewhat
more strained again last year. The aggregate deficit rose
to 2.9% of GDP, having reached 2.7% in 2003 (cf.
table 5). Germany, France and Greece have been breach-
ing the Maastricht criteria for some time now; Portugal
and, most recently, Italy have now joined them, while
the Netherlands appear to have only just fulfilled the
deficit criterion again last year. With the exception of
Italy and Portugal, the situation in these countries will
improve only very slightly this year. In view of this situ-
ation, the European Commission has now proposed a
looser interpretation of the Stability and Growth Pact
and suggested that countries in difficulty should be
given more time to implement adjustment measures.
In view of the only moderate degree of economic
recovery, little progress will be made as regards fiscal
policy consolidation. The deficit ratio will fall to around
2.6% this year and to 2.4% next year; fiscal policy will
have a slightly restrictive effect. The two largest econo-
mies in the EU, Germany and France, are likely to suc-
ceed in fulfilling the Maastricht criteria.
More restrictive monetary conditions
Short-term (three-month) interest rates in the euro zone
have amounted to 2.1% _ which corresponds to almost
0% in real terms _ for the last 18 months now. Long-
term rates _ measured as the yield on ten-year govern-
ment bonds _ recently amounted to almost 4% (less than
2% in real terms). This is a historically low level, and it
shows that interest rates themselves are stimulating the
economy in the euro zone. However, the successive
upward revaluations of the euro have dampened
growth. At over US $ 1.30 per euro on the most recent
figures, the exchange rate is almost 10% higher than in
summer 2004. Since then, the monetary parameters have
become more restrictive (cf. figure 5). 
The expansion of lending to the private sector accel-
erated slightly in the second half of 2004. The volume of
new loans grew by 6.8% on recent figures, and therefore
more rapidly by over one percentage point than at the
beginning of the year. At 7.8%, growth in lending to pri-
vate individuals expanded even more briskly. Loans to
the business sector, at 5.2%, also expanded more
robustly.
This forecast is based on the assumption that in
view of the dampening effect of the rise in exchange
rates, the ECB will maintain its chosen course through-
out 2005 at the least and thus leave interest rates at their
current level. A gradual increase in interest rates can be
expected in 2006 at the earliest.7
Growth in Great Britain continues to 
exceed EU average
The robust upturn in Great Britain weakened somewhat
in the second half of 2004; this was in reaction to the fact
that economic policy has been less expansive for some
time now (cf. figure 6). In particular on the basis of con-
cern about the boom on the property market, the Bank
of England had raised base rates perceptibly during the
previous year and a half; subsequently, long-term inter-
est rates also rose substantially. The upward price trend
on the property market has since eased, without the
widely feared crash having ever materialised. As
employment prospects remain favourable, the increase
in real disposable income is still significant, and private
consumption growth has been curtailed only slightly.
Overall capacity utilisation remained high, and business
investments continued to rise.
7   Cf. the relevant section in the Economic Policy chapter of this report
for the monetary policy recommendations.
Table 5
Public Budget Financial Balance1 for the 
EMU Countries
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Germany –2.8 –3.7 –3.8 –3.8 –3.1 –2.5
France –1.5 –3.2 –4.1 –3.8 –3.4 –3.0
Italy –2.6 –2.3 –2.4 –3.2 –3.6 –3.8
Spain –0.4 0.0 0.4 –0.5 0.5 0.0
Netherlands 0.0 –1.9 –3.2 –3.0 –2.5 –2.2
Belgium 0.5 0.1 0.4 –0.3 –0.4 –0.5
Austria 0.3 –0.2 –1.1 –1.4 –2.0 –1.8
Finland 5.2 4.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.2
Greece –3.7 –3.7 –4.6 –5.8 –4.2 –3.6
Portugal –4.4 –2.7 –2.8 –3.5 –3.8 –3.9
Ireland 0.9 –0.2 0.1 –0.4 –0.5 –0.5
Luxembourg 6.4 2.8 0.8 –0.9 –1.5 –2.0
EMU countries2 –1.6 –2.3 –2.7 –2.9 –2.6 –2.4
1 As % of gross domestic product; apportionment according to Maastricht Treaty. 
— 2 Total of countries listed. Weighted by 2003 GDP in euro.
Sources: ECB; Eurostat; European Commission; 2004 and 2006: DIW Berlin esti-
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As government spending rises robustly, fiscal policy
is still on an expansive course; however, spending
growth is abating, and the economic policy impulses are
therefore decreasing. The pace of growth will diminish
slightly as the world economy expands less rapidly.
Economic growth will remain strong, however, com-
pared to the other large EU economies, amounting to
3% this year and to 2.7% in 2006. Unemployment will
remain entrenched at a low level. The inflation rate
(HICP) is likely, at almost 2%, to amount to close to the
Bank of England's target level.
1 Lending rates from January 2003 onwards: 1 to 5 years, up to 1 million euro, new business, up to September 2004. — 2 Up to November 2004. — 3 Preceding 1998 exchange
rate between US dollar and synthetic euro. — 4 Compared with a wide group of countries, based on consumer prices.
Sources: European Central Bank; Eurostat; DIW Berlin calculations.
Figure 5
The Monetary Situation in the Euro Zone
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The German Economy
Prospect of recovery
The German economy emerged from stagnation last
year. As has been the case in previous upturns, the
increase in external demand was once again the driving
force behind the stronger macroeconomic growth. Ini-
tially, German exporters sold more goods on the US
market, and this impetus was reinforced by a robust rise
in demand from East Asia, especially from China. Sales
to other European countries, which together account for
over half of all German exports, grew in significance
over the further course of the year. The growth dynamic
was only very slightly curtailed by the marked appreci-
ation of the euro at the beginning of 2004 (cf. figure 7
and table 7).
On the domestic demand side, by contrast, prospects
remained gloomy. The main reasons were the acute job
uncertainty overshadowing the labour markets and the
extremely weak rate of income growth. The real value of
disposable income increased only very slightly as a
result of substantial cost saving through reductions of
non-negotiated wage components and the decision by
wage bargainers not to seek productivity-based wage
increases. In addition, there was a further rise in the sav-
ings ratio, which was probably due in part to the expec-
tation of further cuts in the course of the labour market
reform (Hartz IV). Together, all of these factors led to a
slight fall in private consumer spending.
Investment growth was also only moderate. Inves-
tors' expectations of profitable business investment
opportunities were only gradually borne out over the
course of the year. Capacity utilisation only recently
began to rise again, as did investment activity.
The conditions are favourable this year for a steady
upward growth trend. Exports will continue to bolster
macroeconomic expansion, even if the force of the impe-
tus will abate to some degree. The fact that growth will
be becoming increasingly robust in the other countries
of Europe will have a positive effect. While the labour
market and social security reforms will improve supply
conditions, in a large, open economy, this alone will not
suffice to generate adequate growth if investment does
not also expand dynamically. But investments can only
grow when the sales expectations of enterprises become
more favourable _ a prerequisite that is only partially
given in Germany at the moment. Thus, the continued
weak rate of wage growth and the only slight waning of
job uncertainty suggest that private consumption will
remain the German economy's Achilles' heel this year,
too. However, as employment rises again, private con-
sumption will also stabilise (cf. figure 8).
1 Change (%) on the previous quarter, annualised rate. — 2 Change (%) on the pre-
vious year.
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Assuming that the euro exchange rate will stay at
the current level, exports will remain the driving force
behind growth. As interest rates remain low, there will
be greater motivation to expand capacities. Profit
incomes increased significantly last year. A perceptible
reduction in the burden of costs as demand rises and
ongoing favourable refinancing conditions indicate that
profits will rise this year, too. All in all, the economy will
continue to gain pace this year; macroeconomic perform-
ance is likely to increase by 1.8% on annual average.
Next year the domestic forces for growth can be
expected to strengthen, while the stimulus exerted by
exports and investments will weaken. Real GDP will
increase by 2%.
Exports: stable at high level
German goods exports expanded extremely substan-
tially in the first three quarters of last year. The growth
in exports to the euro zone, which _ accounting for a
share of around 44% _ is by far the most important
sales market for German products, was particularly pos-
itive. Exports to the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe also rose significantly once again. The increases
in visible trade with Poland, but also with Russia (which
had benefited from the sharp rise in oil prices) were
especially sizeable. Goods exports to South-east Asia
also increased amply. Consignments to China and Japan,
Germany's most important trading partners in Asia,
grew enormously. In trade with Asia, the impulses
exerted by the dynamic economic growth in this region
more than offset the negative effects of the euro's appre-
ciation. Exports to the USA, by contrast, were curbed by
the strong value of the euro (cf. figure 9).
The conditions for the German export economy will
remain favourable over the forecast period. While world
economic growth will lose momentum to some extent,
and the preceding appreciation of the euro will continue
to exert a dampening effect, the resulting fall in demand
will still be offset by the EMU countries, which will
increasingly demand investment goods over the course
of the moderate economic recovery in the euro zone. Ger-
man exporters' trump card is and will remain their high
level of competitiveness, which is likely to further
improve over the forecast period. Against this back-
ground, robust export growth can be expected both this
year and next year. Export growth is likely to amount to
5.7% on annual average in 2005, and to an annual aver-
age 5.2% in 2006 (cf. figure 10).
Imports: moderate growth
Goods imports also expanded substantially in the first
three quarters of last year, albeit at a much weaker rate
than exports. Demand for imports will be stimulated
Assumptions underlying the prognosis
–  The price of crude oil will amount to around US $ 33 per barrel both this year and next year.
–  The euro/dollar exchange rate will remain at a level of US $ 1.30 per euro over the forecast period.
–  The European Central Bank will leave base rates at their current level this year; a slight rise in interest rates can be
expected in 2006 at the earliest.
–  Negotiated wages will rise by around 1.6% this year and by around 1.8% next year.
Box 1
Figure 7
Real Gross Domestic Product in Germany
Adjusted for seasonal and working days effects1
DIW Berlin 2005
1 On the basis of X-12-ARIMA. — 2 Change (%) on the previous quarter, annualised 
rate (right-hand scale). — 3 Change (%) on the previous year.
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both by exports, which contain a large import compo-
nent, and by private consumption over the forecast
period. All in all, imports will grow in real terms by
4.7% this year and by 4.5% in 2006.
Both export and import prices will rise only slightly
over the forecast period. The terms of trade will there-
fore remain more or less unchanged (cf. figure 11).
Private consumption: 
only moderate growth
Private consumption stagnated in Germany over the
course of last year. The main contributing factors were
the decline in employment and the trend for disposable
income. While private consumption recovered to an
Simulation results
As outlined in the introduction to this report, the primary risks
to the accuracy of the forecast are found in the exchange rate
trend for the US dollar and in the effects of a higher oil price
rise than assumed (or a renewed oil price rise). In order to
estimate the effects of a different trend to that described here,
the NiGEM model was used to carry out a simulation calcula-
tion in which a permanently lower exchange rate for the US
dollar (US $ 1.50 per euro) and a permanently higher oil price
(US $ 50 per barrel) were assumed.
The NIGEM model is a macroeconometric multi-country
model. It contains blocks for all the OECD countries, for the
new Central and Eastern European EU countries, and for
China, and regional blocks for East Asia, Latin America, Africa
and the OPEC countries. The model is based on a neo-Key-
nesian model, in which the economic units make decisions on
the basis of forward-looking expectations, but nominal and
real rigidities render the adjustment process extremely slow.
The main indicators determined by forward-looking decision-
making are interest rates, prices, exchange rates and asset
prices. The results of the simulations show that under a sce-
nario of this kind, GDP in Germany and in the euro zone
would be almost 1% lower in the first year than under the base
scenario, while prices would be slightly lower. No monetary
policy reaction was assumed in the simulation. Likewise, no












Year 1 –0.9 –0.5 –0.9 –0.3
Year 2 –0.8 –0.8 –0.7 –0.5
Year 3 –0.5 –0.9 –0.5 –0.8
Source: DIW Berlin calculations.
Box 2
Table 7
Contribution to Growth in Real GDP
In percentage points
DIW estimate July 20041 DIW estimate January 20052 Difference between estimates
2004 2005 2004 2005 2004 2005
Private consumption 0.2 0.7 –0.2 0.5 –0.4 –0.2
Government consumption –0.4 –0.2 –0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2
Machinery 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.5 –0.2 0.0
Other equipment 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Construction 0.0 0.1 –0.2 –0.2 –0.3 –0.3
Investment in stocks 0.4 0.1 1.2 0.2 0.8 0.1
Domestic demand 0.6 1.4 0.0 1.1 0.2 –0.2
Exports 3.2 2.6 3.5 2.3 0.3 –0.4
Imports 1.9 1.8 2.6 1.6 0.6 –0.2
Trade surplus/deficit 1.3 0.8 0.9 0.6 –0.4 –0.2
GDP 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.8 0.1 –0.4
Figures may not sum due to rounding.
1 Data as at June 2004. — 2 Data as at December 2004.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; DIW Berlin calculations.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 1/2005 15
Figure 8
Domestic Demand and Exports by International Comparison
DIW Berlin 2005
1 Seasonally adjusted, at constant prices.
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extent towards the end of the year, a robust upward
trend failed to materialise. Private consumption declined
in 2004 by 0.3% in real terms.
Employment will recover this year, and this is likely
to have a positive impact on consumption prospects.
Effective earnings will expand at a somewhat stronger
rate than previously so that the gross wage and salary
bill per employee, at 0.9%, will increase at a moderately
faster rate. Because of the renewed reduction of the tax
scale alone, net wages and salaries will increase by
around 6.5 billion euro. Above-average incomes will
enjoy the greater benefit from the reduction in the tax
burden, so some of the relief will actually flow into sav-
ings instead of boosting private consumption. The grad-
ual transition to deferred taxation of pensions (under the
Retirement Income Act) will further reduce the burden
on incomes. However, this reduction will be counterbal-
anced by some significant additional burdens. For
example, since the beginning of this year, childless indi-
viduals are subject to a higher contribution rate to long-
term care insurance. The mid-year adjustment of pen-
sion levels will not lead to higher pension payments
because gross wages and salaries stagnated last year.
Dependent employees are facing a rise in health-insur-
ance contribution rates because the new regulation on
dentures, which will come into force in mid-2005, will
raise their rates by 0.45 percentage points; employer
rates will fall by the same amount. The restructuring of
unemployment assistance and social assistance will lead
to additional benefit cuts. On balance, disposable income
will increase by 2.3%; there will be an above-average
rise in the income of the self-employed and in income
from assets. A similar trend can be expected for nominal
consumer spending, so that the savings ratio will fall
marginally. In real terms, private consumer spending
will increase by 0.9%.
The moderate increase in employment is likely to
strengthen private consumer spending over the coming
Figure 9
Regional Trends for German Foreign Trade
1 Special trade, nominal; seasonally adjusted according to Berlin method (BV4);
moving three-month average.
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Adjusted for seasonal and working days effects1
DIW Berlin 2005
1 On the basis of X-12-ARIMA. — 2 Change (%) on the previous quarter, annualised 
rate (right-hand scale). — 3 Change (%) on the previous year.
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year. The growth rate for effective earnings will remain
modest at 1.4% and will not be offset by additional tax
burdens or cuts. The rise in consumer prices is likely to
be marginally weaker. All in all, an increase of 1.1% in
real private consumption can be expected in 2006 (cf.
figure 12).
Inflation to remain weak
Consumer prices were mainly affected last year by the
increase in the price of heating oil and fuels and by the
sharp rises in administered costs. Prices for heating oil
and fuels rose by almost 15% over the course of the
year. All in all, the annual inflation rate amounted to
1.6%.
The energy supply will be a source of sharp price
rises this coming year. Gas prices, which adhere to oil-
price trends following a time lag, will be substantially
increased. In addition, Deutsche Bahn railways will be
raising prices for local and long-distance travel, while
September will bring a further increase in tobacco tax.
The economic development will not exert any inflation-
ary pressure, however. Competitive pressure will remain
high. Labour costs will rise only slightly, while unit
labour costs will fall. The inflation rate will therefore
increase slightly at the beginning of the year, but the
rate of increase will decline again over the further course
of the year. All in all, the consumer price index will rise
by 1.6% this year and by an estimated 1.4% next year.
Growth in machinery investments
For the first time since 2001, last year brought an upturn
in investments by enterprises in machinery and other
equipment. The increase in exports and the low interest
rates had a positive impact on investment activity. The
level of growth (2%) was only weak, however, because
domestic demand was persistently weak and capacity
utilisation remained low, especially in manufacturing
industry. The oil-price hikes also unnerved investors (cf.
figure 13).
Machinery investments are likely to increase mark-
edly over the course of the coming year. The impetus
will be provided by the high demand from abroad, but
also by private consumption. High enterprise profits,
low interest rates and robust share prices will facilitate
financing of investments. Falling unit labour costs and
the stabilisation of the oil price will also have a positive
impact on investment activity. Investment in other
equipment, which has been stable in recent years, will
increase further this year. Investment in machinery and
Figure 11
Real Imports
Adjusted for seasonal and working days effects1
DIW Berlin 2005
1 On the basis of X-12-ARIMA. — 2 Change (%) on the previous quarter, annualised 
rate (right-hand scale). — 3 Change (%) on the previous year.





























Adjusted for seasonal and working days effects1
DIW Berlin 2005
1 On the basis of X-12-ARIMA. — 2 Change (%) on the previous quarter, annualised 
rate (right-hand scale). — 3 Change (%) on the previous year.
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other equipment will rise on average in 2005 by 6.4%,
while an increase of 5% can be expected in 2006.
Construction sector likely to stabilise
The decline in building investments persisted in 2004,
but the pace of the decline diminished (_2.2%). Invest-
ments in commercial construction fell in particular.
Although mortgage rates are favourable, excess capaci-
ties and therefore vacancies in office and commercial
buildings are still deterring enterprises from investing.
The weak level of income growth in private households
is also curbing growth in the building industry.
Investment in housing construction declined only
marginally last year (_0.5%). The conditions for invest-
ment are likely to gradually improve over the forecast
period. The slightly improved labour market situation
and rising disposable income will have a positive impact
on owner-occupied housing construction. Market prices
for apartments and for single-family houses are already
rising again in some cities and conurbations, and the
financing conditions will remain favourable. Thus, the
numerous construction projects for which permits have
already been obtained in advance of the planned aboli-
tion of the subsidy for owner-occupied housing con-
struction will be carried out in this period. This will lead
to a temporary stabilisation of investment in housing
construction. Nonetheless, the unfavourable demo-
graphic trend will increasingly impede a sustained
recovery of building demand in this area.
The vacancies and the resulting supply surpluses in
commercial construction will have to be reduced before
rising demand leads to new building activity. The
number of building permits granted and the incoming
orders received indicate that the commercial construc-
tion sector will remain weak and cannot be expected to
stabilise before the second half of this year. The strained
budget situation at local government level will lead to a
further, if much less severe, decline in public investment
in construction.
All in all, building investments will decline by an
annual average 2.2% in 2005, but 2006 will bring an
increase of 1.4% (cf. figure 14 and table 8).
Little improvement 
on the labour market
The expansion of national output has not yet eased the
situation on the labour market (cf. figure 15). The reason
is not only the rise in productivity, but also the fact that
a substantial share of the additional economic perform-
Figure 13
Real Investment
in Machinery and Other Equipment
Adjusted for seasonal and working days effects1
DIW Berlin 2005
1 On the basis of X-12-ARIMA. — 2 Change (%) on the previous quarter, annualised 
rate (right-hand scale). — 3 Change (%) on the previous year.



























Real Investment in Construction
Adjusted for seasonal and working days effects1
DIW Berlin 2005
1 On the basis of X-12-ARIMA. — 2 Change (%) on the previous quarter, annualised 
rate (right-hand scale). — 3 Change (%) on the previous year.
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ance was achieved on the basis of an increase in annual
working time. Last year the number of unemployed (sea-
sonally adjusted figure) rose constantly. However, the
trend was distorted by statistical effects.8
Not only the number of registered unemployed has
increased, but also the number of employed, albeit only
slightly. The structural transformation of employment
continued, now driven forward in particular by the
labour market reforms. For instance, marginal employ-
ment gained further in importance, while the number of
full-time employees declined once again in 2004. Even
manufacturing industry _ the driving force behind the
economic recovery because of its strong export compo-
nent  _ failed to show any noticeable expansion in the
number of employees on the most recent figures. While
capacity utilisation has increased, it has not yet reached
a level that would necessitate new recruitments.
Marginal employment has been rendered more
attractive since spring 2003 by the new regulation
exempting earnings from so-called mini-jobs from taxa-
tion and social insurance contributions and raising the
maximum wage limit from 325 to 400 euro. The legisla-
tive changes also boosted the expansion of mini-jobs in
2004. In addition, the aid provided for business start-ups
by the unemployed began to show its effects, so that the
number of new 'Ich-AG' firms funded under this scheme
increased. The reforms therefore led to significant
changes on the labour market. However, one change
was a growing decline in insured employment, meaning
that policy makers have accepted a weakening of the
existing system of social security (cf. figure 16). If, on
balance, the volume of labour increased somewhat in
2004, this was simply due to the higher number of work-
ing days.
It has been difficult for a number of years to estimate
the trends for employment and registered unemploy-
ment because of the labour market reforms and their
impact on statistical data. And the difficulties have been
exacerbated this year by the entry into force of the
Fourth Law on Modern Services on the Labour Market
(Hartz IV) (cf. box 3). And yet the prospects are unam-
biguous: There is no reason to expect a significant
improvement in the labour market situation this year,
either. The pace of economic growth is not strong
enough to exert a positive impact of this dimension, and
the number of employed will increase at only a slightly
stronger pace than last year. Given that growth in
demand for labour always lags behind output growth,
the increase in employment will accelerate to some
extent only towards the end of the year.
It is difficult to say whether the trend increase in
self-employment will continue at its current pace. This
applies in particular to the Ich-AGs, for these will be
monitored more closely from the end of 2004 onwards,
for example with respect to the viability of their busi-
ness concept and to the ascertainment that a self-
employed activity has genuinely been taken up. In addi-
tion, probably more than a few recipients of unemploy-
ment assistance were able to establish that they will not
qualify for unemployment benefit and consequently
founded an Ich-AG last year in order to at least receive
the aid provided under this scheme.
The number of jobs for dependent employees can be
expected to increase, especially in the low-wage sector,
and the increase will be in the form of so-called 'one-euro
jobs'. Marginal employment is also likely to increase,
although for the recipients of the new Unemployment
Benefit II who were working in marginal jobs in the pri-
vate sector up to now, mini-jobs will be made unattrac-
tive by the fact that a higher share of the wages earned
in this way will now be offset against their benefit. By
contrast, regular dependent employment will continue to
expand at only a weak rate.
The overall increase that can be expected in the
number of employed will be accompanied by only a
moderate degree of expansion in the volume of labour.
8  The unemployment statistics were substantially revised in 2003,
with the result that a large number of individuals were removed from
the unemployment register either because they were classified as unfit
for work or unwilling to work or because they continued to claim an
early retirement pension on the basis of their age.
Table 8
Building Investment1 in Germany
2003 2004 2005 2006
Euro billion
Housing 121.1 120.6 118.3 120.6
Non-residential2 89.0 84.9 83.1 83.7
Government 26.5 24.8 24.1 23.7
Other sectors 62.5 60.1 59.0 60.0
Total3 210.1 205.5 201.5 204.3
Change (%) on the previous year
Housing –2.7 –0.5 –1.9 2.0
Non-residential2 –4.0 –4.6 –2.0 0.6
Government –10.4 –6.6 –2.5 –1.7
Other sectors –1.0 –3.8 –1.9 1.6
Total –3.2 –2.2 –2.0 1.4
Figures may not sum due to rounding.
1 At 1995 prices; on national accounting definitions (ESNA 95). — 2 Building
construction and civil engineering for the public and private sectors.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; 2004 and 2005: DIW Berlin estimate and
prognosis.20 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 1/2005
Because of the lower number of working days compared
to last year, this year will actually bring a reduction in
working time; the number of free working days due to
holidays will return to a normal level.
The rise in employment is likely to accelerate some-
what in 2006. While output growth will not gain
momentum, capacity utilisation will increase and a
somewhat more robust rise in personnel is likely.
Because the growth rate for output will only slightly
exceed that for productivity, once again the situation on
the labour market can be expected to improve only
slightly, although the volume of regular employment
relationships will probably expand at a faster pace than
to date. The number of registered unemployed will prob-
ably fall below 4 million (seasonally adjusted figure)
only at the end of the forecast period.
Figure 15
Persons in Employment and Unemployed
Seasonally adjusted1
1 On the basis of X-12-ARIMA.
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Public budgets: significant decline in 
deficit ratio – extremely restrictive
fiscal policy stance
Despite better growth performance and significant con-
solidation efforts on the spending side, the financial situ-
ation in the public budgets did not improve over the
past year. On national accounting definitions, the deficit
of the federal government, Länder, local authorities and
social security funds increased slightly once again, from
81 to 83 billion euro, which corresponded to 3.8% of
nominal GDP.
The reasons for the renewed failure to meet the defi-
cit limit laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact
included not only the hefty tax cuts (15 billion euro),9
but also the fact that the economic recovery has led only
in part so far to higher tax revenue. The recovery was
mainly driven by exports, which are not subject to turn-
over tax; in addition, earned income and employment
The difficulty of estimating the impact of the fourth law 
on modern services on the labour market (Hartz IV)
The fusion of unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe)
and social assistance (Sozialhilfe) under a single benefit enti-
tled 'Unemployment Benefit II' at the beginning of 2005 will
have significant consequences for the labour market, but in
particular for the unemployment statistics.1 Under the new
regulation, persons currently drawing social assistance (ongo-
ing income support) will be considered eligible for Unemploy-
ment Benefit II if they are available to work on the labour mar-
ket. This might lead to an increase in the number of registered
unemployed, but whether it will actually come to this and how
large the rise might be is difficult to assess. Current recipients
of social assistance who are fit for work are already obliged to
register as unemployed at the employment service. And, as
evaluations of data on social assistance show, a large share of
beneficiaries is actually registered as unemployed. There are
also people who are working and at the same time receiving
supplementary social assistance. The number of registered
unemployed should therefore increase at the very most by the
number of recipients of social assistance who are not regis-
tered as unemployed. But a large number of these people are
not fit for work for reasons of age (over-65s or under-15s),
because they are in vocational training, or because they are ill
or disabled. More than a few of the remaining social assis-
tance beneficiaries are not available to the labour market
because they are bound to their homes by caring for a family
member. When all of these categories are excluded, esti-
mates to date suggest that between just less than 200 0002
and around 300 0003 people could be made available the
labour market.
Amongst those currently drawing unemployment assistance
and those whose entitlement to current unemployment benefit
will expire in the future, there are likely to be some who will not
be eligible for Unemployment Benefit II, for example because
the calculable income in their household exceeds the maxi-
mum limits or because they are in possession of assets. Of
the applications for Unemployment Benefit II processed by
October 2004, 7% were turned down on the basis of failure to
meet the necessary criteria. However, it is likely that the com-
paratively 'simple' applications were dealt with up to that date.
Applicants who are close to or in excess of the maximum lim-
its for income or assets will probably have submitted their
applications late or not at all. Thus, the share of recipients of
unemployment assistance who will not be granted the new
benefit is probably higher. It is likely that quite a few unem-
ployed who will not be eligible for Unemployment Benefit II will
drop out of the statistics altogether in future because there is
not enough incentive for them to register once again as unem-
ployed. The introduction of one-euro jobs will also have an
effect on the number of registered unemployed because peo-
ple who work more than 15 hours a week in this kind of
employment relationship will no longer be considered unem-
ployed under the relevant regulation.
The dimension of the effect of these opposing factors on the
number of unemployed remains to be seen. In the past, the
number of registered unemployed was already a problematic
indicator for measuring under-employment, and the most
recent labour market reform renders it even less suitable than
before. Thus, persons who are actually unavailable to the
labour market should be subtracted from the number of regis-
tered unemployed. And those unemployed who are not regis-
tered but are looking for work would have to be added on. The
same applies to those who, in the absence of work, are partic-
ipating in further training measures, and for those who have
taken on employment with shorter working hours than they
really wanted. From this year on, the monthly data from the
official Labour Force Survey, which is based on the ILO's defi-
nition of unemployment, should shed more light on the actual
extent of under-employment.
1  Cf. Helmuth Rudolph: 'Aktualisierte Schätzungen zum Start von
ALG II'. In: IAB Kurzbericht, no. 11/2004. Also cf. Hilmar Schneider et
al.: 'Beschäftigungspotentiale einer dualen Förderstrategie im Niedri-
glohnbereich'. In: IZA Research Report, no. 5/2002.
2  Cf. H. Schneider et al., loc. cit. Their calculations are based on social
assistance data from 2001; however, they took a broad range of char-
acteristics into consideration that suggest less availability to the labour
market.
3  Cf. H. Rudolf, loc. cit., based on the social assistance data from 2003.
Box 3
9  Measures aimed at offsetting the resulting revenue losses included
the abolition of tax concessions and the introduction of a tax amnesty
intended to encourage the taxable repatriation of illicit funds deposited
abroad. However, at just less than 1 billion euro, the income was much
less substantial than initially anticipated by the German government.
Additional revenue from tobacco tax was also lower than expected.22 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 1/2005
failed to rise. However, taxes on profits brought sub-
stantial increases in revenue. There were significant
losses in property income received because the profits
transferred by the German Bundesbank to the federal
budget were minimal. The stagnation of earned income
meant that social security contributions also barely
increased. All in all, government income declined by
0.3% on 2003. And, for the first time in the history of the
Federal Republic of Germany, spending also declined
(_0.2%). Not only government investment spending, but
also subsidies and the relatively substantial wage and
salary expenses in the public sector were reduced.
Above all, however, the savings made in the course of
the health reform made themselves felt.
The austerity course in the public budgets will be
continued this year, and spending is likely to decrease
again slightly (_0.1%). The fusion of unemployment
assistance and social assistance for those who are fit for
work will be a particular source of savings; the criteria
as to what constitutes a 'reasonable' job offer have been
tightened up, as has the procedure for means testing.
The forecast estimates that spending will decrease by 2
billion euro. On balance, a decline of 0.7% in monetary
social security benefits, which account for the most sig-
nificant outlay on the spending side, is forecast. The
trend will also be curbed by the fact that pensions will
not rise. However, because of stagnating gross income
last year, the 'sustainability factor', which would have
curtailed pension spending, will not take effect.10 The
impact of the measures taken under the health reform
will presumably persist so that only a small increase can
be expected in social benefits in kind. However, the
introduction of mandatory insurance for persons receiv-
ing Unemployment Benefit II will burden the statutory
health insurance funds with additional expenditure
because only minimum contributions are paid for these
beneficiaries.
Further cuts in subsidies are likely, especially those
granted to the coal-mining industry. The high prices on
world markets are significant in this respect, for part of
the coal subsidy is intended to offset the difference
between domestic production costs and world market
prices. Personnel spending in the public sector is likely
to rise only slightly (0.8%). Jobs will continue to be shed
as negotiated wage rises remain moderate, even if this
process will be curtailed by the fact that additional jobs
will be created in the unemployment insurance sector so
that the recipients of Unemployment Benefit II can be
given better care. A further reduction in special pay-
ments can also be expected.
Despite the high government deficit, the rise in inter-
est rates will remain minimal (almost 2%). The volume
of refinancing is still very high, and high-interest old
debts are being replaced by new loans subject to lower
interest rates. This effect will more than offset the inter-
est load generated by the new debts. Lower spending
than last year can be expected for government asset
transfers and for public investment. For instance, the
federal government will reduce its subsidies to Deutsche
Bahn railways and cuts are also foreseen for regional
support measures. The downward trend in direct public
investment that has persisted for years will probably
not be halted, but it is likely to slow down to some
extent. One reason is the sharp rise in business tax reve-
nue received by the local authorities. In addition, the
financial strain on local governments has been eased by
the fact that the share of revenue they are obliged to
devolve to the Länder and federal government has been
reduced. Efforts can also be expected at all levels of the
budget to recoup some of the loss in revenue caused by
the tax reform by means of cuts in flexible spending, in
other words investment. In addition, the federal govern-
ment will also have to cope with the debacle of the failed
introduction of the autobahn toll for heavy goods vehi-
cles.
Figure 16
Domestic Employees and Insured Employed1
Seasonally adjusted
DIW Berlin 2005
1 New statistical procedure since June 1999.
















10  This factor does take effect if, as a result, the pension would not
only not rise, but would actually be reduced.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 1/2005 23
Although the final phase of the tax reform will enter
into force in 2005, an increase of 1.7% in tax revenue is
forecast. Income-tax cuts will amount to 9 billion euro,
and further revenue losses (1 billion euro) can be
expected as a result of the gradual transition to deferred
pension taxation. Little cyclically determined additional
revenue can be expected from wage tax because wages
and employment will grow only moderately, and the
expansion of marginal employment is likely to generate
very little additional income. By contrast, taxes on prof-
its, and especially corporation tax, will continue to rise
rapidly. Turnover tax is likely to increase at a somewhat
weaker pace than the overall tax base because the eco-
nomic recovery will continue to be borne by exports and
increasingly also by private-sector investment, neither
of which are subject to turnover tax. Specific excise
duties can be expected to show moderate growth.
Tobacco tax was raised again at the end of last year,
and the decline in revenue from mineral-oil tax is likely
to come to a halt as falling oil prices and the economic
recovery boost demand.
Social security contributions will rise only very
slightly, mainly as a result of the weak growth in
income and employment. And other revenue will also
rise only modestly. One reason is that as a result of the
exchange-rate trend for the dollar, the profit transferred
to the government budget by the German Bundesbank
will again be quite negligible (1 billion euro). The sys-
tem of national accounting will not take account of earn-
ings from privatisations planned this year by the Ger-
man government in order to be able to present a budget
in line with constitutional provisions; however, this
amounts to no more than restructuring of assets any-
way. But the deficit will actually be reduced when, as
planned, the long-term claims of the pension fund for
postal and telecommunications employees on these com-
panies are sold off and the proceeds are used to pay the
pensions due from this fund in the coming years. The
federal government will be saved the cost of subsidies to
this pension fund during this time, but its future obliga-
tions will then be all the more substantial. This forecast
does not take account of the related potential savings of
around 5 billion euro, nor does it consider the repayment
of aid amounting to over 4 billion euro which, under EU
jurisdiction, was wrongfully granted by the Land bud-
gets to the Land banks.11
The government policy of austerity can be expected
to reduce the budget deficit to just under 70 billion euro
this year _ despite the fact that further tax cuts will
enter into force. The deficit ratio will fall to an estimated
3.1% of nominal GDP; when the special factors men-
tioned above are taken into account (reimbursement of
subsidies, sale of pension claims), the deficit ratio will
have been reduced to well below 3%. In any case, fiscal
policy will exert significant restrictive effects on eco-
nomic growth because the expansive impetus received
from the tax cuts will be more than offset by savings on
the spending side. According to the DIW Berlin's stimu-
lus concept,12 the dampening effect will amount to at
least 15 billion euro or 0.8% of nominal GDP (cf. table 9).
Under the expected macroeconomic conditions and
under the assumption that fiscal policy will continue to
pursue the path of austerity, a further perceptible
decline in the government deficit can be expected in
2006. The estimates suggest a decrease in the order of 58
billion euro or 2.5% of nominal GDP.
Tax revenue will begin to expand again at a some-
what more robust pace (2.5%) as the economy livens up.
In addition to taxes on profits, wage tax will generate
substantial additional revenue because there will be no
further tax cuts and progressive income-tax rates will
take full effect again. However, it must also be expected
in 2006 that the upturn on the labour market will be
borne by mini-jobs, and this will dampen revenue from
wage tax. The same applies to the trend for social secu-
rity contributions (1%). Consumption-based taxes are
likely to rise at a rate of 2%.
An increase of 0.7% is forecast for government
spending. Monetary social benefits are likely to stag-
nate, while pension payments will expand only weakly.
Social benefits in kind will rise relatively robustly
because efforts to contain costs in the health system will
no longer exert the same dampening effect as previ-
ously. Very moderate wage growth can be expected
once again in the public service, and the number of pub-
lic-sector jobs is likely to decline further. Despite the
high level of new debt, interest spending will again rise
only moderately because of the high volume of debt
rescheduling; this effect will become less significant in
the coming years. The improved financial situation of
the local governments is likely to bring the decline in
public investment to a halt, although the level of invest-
ment will still remain very low. Government activity
will also exert a dampening effect on overall demand in
2006 _ at a magnitude of 17 billion euro or 0.8% of GDP.
11  Such repayments are entered in the national accounts as received
transfers of assets by the state. The Länder intend to immediately re-
transfer these funds back to the Land banks as equity interest. Equity
participation is factored out of the national accounts but is taken into
account in the financial statistics. 
12  Demand impulses are defined as deviations of revenue and expend-
iture from their actual levels the previous year, extrapolated by the
medium-term trend for nominal GDP. All changes in government
activity, in other words both discretionary measures and changes
based on the effects of automatic stabilisers, are considered relevant to
demand. 24 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 1/2005
Table 9
Government Demand Impulses1, 2 (Local Authorities and Social Insurance Funds)
+ expansion / – contraction; euro billion
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 20043 20053 20063
Taxes
Real volume 422.04 443.64 476.04 495.83 473.96 475.93 481.09 479.06 488.61 501.10
Neutrality line 429.86 435.10 455.40 487.60 508.17 485.26 485.28 490.90 489.20 499.64
Difference 7.82 –8.54 –20.64 –8.23 34.21 9.33 4.19 11.84 0.59 –1.46
Social security contributions
Real volume 366.56 370.42 373.74 376.37 381.85 387.27 393.75 394.64 397.68 402.34
Neutrality line 365.31 377.90 380.24 382.82 385.74 390.96 394.88 401.78 403.00 406.65
Difference –1.25 7.48 6.50 6.45 3.89 3.69 1.13 7.14 5.32 4.31
Other revenue
Real volume 78.04 78.95 79.28 77.20 80.44 80.49 78.35 74.07 75.18 76.47
Neutrality line 84.60 80.45 81.04 81.21 79.12 82.36 82.07 79.95 75.64 76.88
Difference 6.56 1.50 1.76 4.01 –1.32 1.87 3.72 5.88 0.46 0.41
Total revenue
Real volume 866.64 893.01 929.06 949.40 936.25 943.69 953.19 947.77 961.47 979.91
Neutrality line 879.76 893.45 916.68 951.63 973.03 958.58 962.23 972.62 967.84 983.17
Difference 13.12 0.44 –12.38 2.23 36.78 14.89 9.04 24.85 6.37 3.26
Purchase of goods and services
Real volume 234.83 237.00 241.63 243.76 246.70 252.24 252.93 251.25 252.94 254.67
Neutrality line 243.48 242.09 243.28 247.50 249.83 252.58 257.20 258.09 256.57 258.65
Difference –8.65 –5.09 –1.65 –3.74 –3.13 –0.34 –4.27 –6.84 –3.62 –3.98
Income from property (interest spending)
Real volume 68.10 69.75 68.87 68.39 67.72 65.22 66.23 67.60 68.85 70.30
Neutrality line 69.34 70.21 71.60 70.54 70.09 69.34 66.50 67.58 69.03 70.40
Difference –1.24 –0.46 –2.73 –2.15 –2.37 –4.12 –0.27 0.02 –0.18 –0.10
Transfers
Real volume 578.98 593.28 610.20 624.00 644.54 666.10 683.03 680.92 677.18 680.85
Neutrality line 590.14 596.89 609.01 625.02 639.53 659.91 679.19 696.95 695.34 692.46
Difference –11.16 –3.61 1.19 –1.02 5.01 6.19 3.84 –16.03 –18.16 –11.61
Gross investment
Real volume 35.50 35.74 37.67 36.33 35.86 34.31 31.10 30.54 29.85 29.80
Neutrality line 40.24 36.60 36.69 38.59 37.23 36.72 34.98 31.73 31.19 30.52
Difference –4.74 –0.86 0.98 –2.26 –1.37 –2.41 –3.88 –1.19 –1.34 –0.72
Total spending
Real volume 917.41 935.77 958.37 972.48 994.82 1017.87 1033.29 1030.31 1028.82 1035.62
Neutrality line 943.21 945.79 960.57 981.65 996.68 1018.54 1037.87 1054.35 1052.12 1052.04
Difference –25.80 –10.02 –2.20 –9.17 –1.86 –0.67 –4.58 –24.04 –23.30 –16.42
Demand impulses incl. interest spending –12.67 –9.58 –14.58 –6.94 34.92 14.21 4.46 0.81 –16.93 –13.16
Demand impulses excl. interest spending –11.43 –9.12 –11.85 –4.79 37.29 18.33 4.73 0.79 –16.75 –13.06
1 Based on the medium-term trend for nominal GDP. — 2 Excluding transactions with the rest of the world. — 3 DIW Berlin estimate.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; DIW Berlin calculations.DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 1/2005 25
Eastern Germany
The picture of a divided economic development is evi-
dent in the eastern German economy, too, although it is
more sharply delineated in the new Länder. Industrial
output accelerated further last year, again growing at a
stronger rate than in western Germany. As in the west-
ern part of the country, the impetus in the east was also
mainly provided by foreign demand, but domestic
demand also increased. Growth can be expected to con-
tinue this year, as is indicated by the increase in incom-
ing orders. In addition, the stronger investment dynamic
will have a positive effect on the relatively small eastern
German industrial sector.
Output in the construction sector weakened further.
In 2004, it thus continued its downward slide for the
tenth year in a row, even if the pace of the decline dimin-
ished. The development varied across the different
branches of the industry. Civil engineering enjoyed a
favourable trend, while structural engineering continued
to decline. Public-sector spending on building fell as in
previous years _ a tendency that reflects the strained
financial situation in the eastern German local govern-
ments, but also the fact that the funds made available
under Solidarity Pact II are only partly being spent on
investment. The sharp decline in housing construction
was greatly curtailed, for building output was brought
forward by the discussion about the abolition of the sub-
sidy for owner-occupied housing construction. Next
year, a stronger decline in demand can be expected in
this segment of the market. Public investment spending
is likely to decrease further. There is also no sign of a
turnaround in commercial construction, as is indicated
by the high volume of vacancies overall. In general, con-
struction demand will be curtailed by the decline in the
population.
The demographic trend will also have a negative
effect on retail trade and consumer-oriented services.
This probably contributed to the fact that there was less
activity in both the retail trade and the hospitality
industry in 2004 than in the previous year. In addition,
spending was probably curtailed by the planned intro-
duction of Unemployment Benefit II. The new benefit
will have a much stronger effect in eastern than in west-
ern Germany; the number of persons drawing unem-
ployment assistance in the new federal states is cur-
rently over three times as high per capita as in western
Germany.
Economic performance in eastern Germany only
increased by less than 1.5% in real terms in 2004;
growth is likely to be of a similar magnitude this year
and next year (cf. table 10). Given that productivity is
rising relatively robustly in eastern Germany, employ-
ment will continue to fall _ at least on the regular labour
market.
Table 10
Key Forecast Figures for Germany
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Gross domestic product1 (percentage change over previous year) 0.8 0.1 –0.1 1.8 1.8 2.0
Western Germany  1.0 0.1 –0.2 1.8 1.8 2.0
Eastern Germany (excluding Berlin)  –0.2 0.1 0.2 1.2 1.4 1.5
Gainfully employed2 (in 000s)  38 923 38 696 38 316 38 370 38 586 38 906
Unemployed (in 000s)  3 853 4 060 4 377 4 383 4 375 4 003
Unemployment rate3 (as a percentage)  9.0 9.5 10.3 10.3 10.2 9.3
Not gainfully employed4 (in 000s)  3 109 3 438 3 838 3 925 3 924 3 552
Percentage not gainfully employed5 7.4 8.2 9.1 9.3 9.2 8.4
Consumer prices6 (percentage change over the previous year)  2.0 1.4 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.4
Unit labour costs7 (percentage change over the previous year) 1.3 0.8 0.7 –1.4 –0.7 –0.2
Public sector financial balance8
Euro billion –58.6 –77.5 –81.3 –82.7 –69.5 –58.2
As % of nominal GDP –2.8 –3.7 –3.8 –3.8 –3.1 –2.5
1 At 1995 prices. — 2 National (annual average based on quarterly figures). — 3 Unemployed as a percentage of the national workforce. — 4 In accordance with the conven-
tion of the International Labour Organization (ILO). — 5 Persons not gainfully employed as a percentage of the national workforce. — 6 Price index for the cost of living of all pri-
vate households. — 7 Labour costs (compensation of employees per employee) in relation to labour productivity (gross domestic product at 1995 prices per person gainfully 
employed). — 8 As defined by the national income and expenditure accounts (ESVG95 – Europäisches System volkswirtschaftlicher Gesamtrechnungen – European System 
of Integrated Economic Accounts).
Sources: Federal Statistical Office; German Bundesbank; DIW Berlin calculations; 2004 and 2006: DIW Berlin estimate and prognosis.26 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 1/2005
Economic Policy
The challenges facing economic policy would appear to
have lessened with the cyclical recovery. The rise in the
oil prices certainly put a strain on almost every economy
but this eased again in the course of the year. So the
dampening was only temporary, particularly as the oil-
producing countries are expected to spend their extra
income, which will stimulate world trade. There are
greater risks to the German economy from the rise in the
external value of the euro. So far the upward trend has
been fuelled by exports, but any further rise in the euro
would put increasing pressure on the competitiveness of
German companies on international markets, and jeop-
ardise the cyclical upswing.
Exports are still the driving force of the economic
recovery, and the stimulus from abroad will only gradu-
ally spread to the other demand components. Invest-
ment activity will benefit particularly; however, it will
not develop the dynamic of earlier upswing phases.
Domestic demand, especially private consumption, is
still weak, and here the stagnation in mass incomes is
having an effect, particularly as the wage restraint
being practised throughout the economy, and which is
particularly apparent in the negative drift of collectively
agreed and actual wages, is not bringing a rise in
employment. The outlook on the labour market is still
gloomy, another important reason why consumer confi-
dence in the future has been very slow to improve. In the
immediate future private households will not feel
encouraged to reduce their savings ratio, which persists
on a high level. Nor is demand from the state for goods
and services providing positive impetus. The tax cuts
are increasing disposable incomes, but these expansion-
ary effects are well outweighed by the cutbacks in state
expenditure.
On no account must the economic policy decision-
makers allow themselves to be tempted into inactivity
by the cyclical recovery _ the risks from the weakness of
domestic demand are too great. Altogether it is to be
expected that economic policy will not provide the stim-
ulus to domestic demand needed to create a self-sustain-
ing upswing. Incomes policy is still restrictive and wage
policy abandoned productivity-orientation a long time
ago. This is easing the cost burden on companies and
the pressure on prices, but real wages are also lagging
behind the progress in productivity, and this is holding
back demand in Germany. The lower rate of price
increases will not be without effect on real interest rates,
which will rise slightly further, and so weaken invest-
ment activity.
The strong rise in the external value of the euro and
the weakness in domestic demand to date in large parts
of Europe require a response from monetary policy.
Monetary conditions have become more stringent for all
the countries in the EU, and the medium-term inflation
outlook is clearly below the ECB's target. This offers
scope for easing monetary policy, but with the ECB's
practice hitherto the prospects of such a step are very
slight. All the more reason for action to be taken in fiscal
policy. However, it, too, is bound by the strict rules of
the European currency union, and in fact the scope for
fiscal policy was fully utilised a long time ago in the per-
sistent stagnation, and it is becoming increasingly evi-
dent that the Stability and Growth Pact is more of a hin-
drance than a help to economies in overcoming a long-
lasting crisis. Insofar the start of discussion over reform
in recent months was in itself progress, and the rigid
rules have been interpreted more flexibly now in prac-
tice as well.
European monetary policy – a more 
expansionary course justified
Despite the unusually heavy strain imposed last year by
the rise in the prices of crude oil and raw materials the
rise in consumer prices will be astonishingly little above
the ECB's target figure this year. So there is no risk of
inflation, and no sign of second round effects from the
leap in prices, which with rising wages pressure could
start an inflationary trend. Beside the rise in energy
prices the inflation rate in many countries is determined
by administered price rises and the underlying dynamic
in inflation is less. Moreover, as the surge in raw materi-
als prices ebbs again the pressure on prices from this
side will lessen markedly.
In addition, monetary framework conditions have
been worsening steadily for a long time owing to the rise
in the external value of the euro _ particularly against
the US dollar. This development in the exchange rate is
making industry in the euro zone less competitive and in
itself putting a strain on the upswing, which, with the
slackness in domestic demand is only slowly gathering
momentum.
No further appreciation of the euro is assumed in
this prognosis. Nevertheless, the question is being
debated in public whether, in view of the appreciation
pressure in recent months, there is need for action by the
ECB. On principle a central bank has two options in
such a situation if it wants to reduce movements in the
exchange rate and ease the upward pressure on the cur-
rency: it can intervene in the foreign exchange markets
or it can change interest rates. One-sided intervention
can be successful if the intervening central bank holds a
currency whose value is expected to rise, and the
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disadvantage of intervention is that in such a case no
contribution of note is made to reducing disequilibria in
the world economy. Sooner or later, therefore, the ten-
sions in the international exchange rate structure could
increase.
The other option is to pursue an interest rate policy
that will underpin the economic development with infla-
tion rates in line with the target. At present there is
another argument in favour of low interest rates in this
prognosis period, beside the low level of inflation and
the high levels of unutilised capacities to date: The
change over which will shortly be made in some coun-
tries in the euro zone in calculating the price index to
what are known as hedonic indices, which take much
better account of quality improvements, will probably
mean that the inflation rates so measured will be lower
than forecast here. This effect cannot be exactly pre-
dicted at present, but it is an additional argument in
favour of utilising the scope in monetary policy.
Wage policy considerations
Unit wage costs have remained constant in Germany in
the last ten years, as a result of low wage rises, while in
the United States and the rest of the European Currency
Area (EMU) they have risen by 17% and 18% respec-
tively. Since the start of EMU six years ago Germany
has greatly increased its price competitiveness against
the rest of the currency area (cf. figure 17). Within a sin-
gle currency area nominal exchange rate corrections are
no longer possible, so differences in the developments in
unit wage costs and prices are fully reflected in trade
between the member states. Hence, Germany's implicit
real external value is steadily decreasing against its
trading partners, and its competitiveness is steadily
increasing. The German surplus on goods trade within
the EMU has risen in the course of this development
from 1998 to 2004 by around 50 billion euros (from
28 billion euros to an estimated 80 billion). At the same
time the German deficit on trade in services with the
other EMU member states has remained almost con-
stant in recent years, at around 30 billion euros a year.
Germany has regained its leading position in exports,
but it is lagging behind the EMU in economic growth.
How does this fit together?
Below-average wage rises do improve international
competitiveness, so they help exports and hamper
imports. But they also play a big part in holding down
domestic demand. The external and internal develop-
ments are no longer in balance. Within a single currency
area the central bank can only orient to the average
price and economic development in fixing its monetary
policy. Before the start of the currency union the Deut-
sche Bundesbank could acknowledge moderate wage
and price increases by keeping interest rates low. In the
EMU the ECB cannot sanction individual countries for
Figure 17
Unit Labour Costs1 
in International Comparison
DIW Berlin 2005
1 Gross income from dependent employment as a share of real GDP; seasonally 
adjusted.
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failing to meet the inflation target, so countries with
above-average wage and price increases, like Spain,
profit from their low real interest rates, indeed some are
negative rates. A high level of domestic demand and a
low level of real interest rates are the main reasons for
the powerful economic growth in these countries. In
countries with below-average wage and price rises and
high real interest rates, like Germany, on the other hand,
growth is held back. So monetary policy has a procycli-
cal effect for some countries.
This development is strengthened by the rules of the
Stability and Growth Pact. Countries with low growth
rates and low inflation rates quickly reach the upper
limit for the budget deficit and are then forced to econo-
mise on public spending or raise taxes. In itself that
depresses growth and prices further. Countries with a
high growth rate and higher inflation rates do not have
to economise, although in a good cyclical situation that
would be in the interests of the entire currency area.
With procyclical public budgets they actually
strengthen the tendencies to growth and inflation. Some
countries with above-average growth rates, like Spain,
benefit further because on balance they are receiving
financial support, while in Germany, a net contributor to
the EU, the public budgets are even further constricted
by the outflow of funds.
Now in itself the development in price competitive-
ness counteracts the divergent trends within the cur-
rency union. A positive net effect on economic develop-
ment results mainly for small and very open economies,
where exports and imports account for a bigger share in
GDP. Larger and less open economies like Germany, on
the other hand, cannot pursue that path successfully,
because the restrictive effects of low wages on domestic
demand are too high. In addition, developments in large
economies have considerable repercussions on the entire
currency area.
According to the prognosis presented here wage
rises in Germany will remain below the EMU average in
the next two years as well. Hence German competitive-
ness within the EMU will increase further. But this will
also prevent the present strong stimulus from abroad
from providing the necessary impetus to the domestic
economy. The growth in private households' disposable
incomes will not be fuelled by wages in this prognosis
period but by the strongly rising incomes to the self-
employed, who are the group with the above-average
savings rate. So in the main the moderate cyclical trend,
fuelled by foreign trade, will continue. Germany will
make little contribution from its own growth rate to
growth in the EMU. The worsening competitiveness of
most of the other EMU member states will increasingly
hamper growth in these countries as well, and Germany
will not be able to act as driving force in their stead.
The guideline for wage policy in Germany and the
other EMU member states should be the ECB's target
inflation rate of 2% and the average growth in produc-
tivity in the individual countries. Countries catching up
economically, with above-average productivity
increases, will thus also be able to afford higher nominal
and real wages, without excessive price increases.
Administratively induced price rises will, however, cor-
respondingly narrow the scope for wage rises, and on no
account must increases in the oil price be taken as the
reason for additional wage increases. Otherwise the
ECB's inflation target would be jeopardised. If this wage
guideline is followed conflict between wage policy and
monetary policy would be impossible, even on federal
state level, and not only _ more by chance _ on EMU
level, as has been evident in recent years.
For Germany, with adherence to this wage guideline
and taking administrative price rises and changes in
contribution rates into account, there would be arithmet-
ical scope for actual hourly wage rises of about 3% a
year. However, this prognosis is based on wage rises of
only a good 1%. Deviations from the wage line are
always appropriate if they serve to correct larger devia-
tions in the wage trend in the past and/or entry into
EMU at the wrong exchange rate. Wage rises below this
guideline at the start of EMU can be said to be justified
in view of the powerful wage rises that resulted directly
from German unification (especially in east Germany),
the strong increases in social insurance contribution
rates to finance a large part of the costs of German unifi-
cation (increase in labour costs) and what may be
assumed to be entry to EMU at too high a rate for the
D-Mark. In view of the correction that has now made
there is no further justification for lagging behind the
trend. Otherwise low wage rises and a weak domestic
economy in Germany will jeopardise the cyclical recov-
ery throughout the euro zone. The special feature of
wages, in being both a cost component and an income
component, cannot be ignored. It may be that wage
reductions in some firms help to secure jobs and can
postpone outsourcing, but they are not a recipe for an
entire economy. Lower wages do lower costs, but they
also hold down domestic demand. In the case of Ger-
many the increases in exports so induced cannot com-
pensate for this decline.
The contradiction that is thought to exist between
the constant demand for lower costs and the need to sta-
bilise incomes cannot be solved in Germany by lowering
wages, it should be tackled by lowering social insurance
contribution rates and compensating for the loss of reve-
nue with higher taxes _ especially higher VAT. Fiscal
policy can still correct the mistake made in financing
German reunification by removing the increases to con-
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employers and employees. That would greatly ease the
strain on labour costs.
The heavy costs of German reunification should
have been financed right from the start through direct
and indirect taxation and not through the social insur-
ance systems. Reunification was a task for society as a
whole and not just those paying social insurance on
their earnings from employment. The big increase
which this caused in benefits provided by the social
insurance system but not covered by the contributions
was out of line with the system. The increases in the
contribution rates introduced at that time also punished
companies for using the factor labour. If contribution
rates were lowered the use of more labour would be
worthwhile to them again.
This way of lowering labour costs has clear advan-
tages for the economy as a whole compared with a wage
reduction strategy. No induced price effects of any note
are to be expected, particularly with the present weak-
ness in the domestic economy, because if contribution
rates are lowered unit wage costs to the employers will
fall, and this has a compensatory effect on the price
increases caused by higher VAT. Not only the export
industry profits from lower contribution rates _ with
higher VAT at the same time. With labour costs rela-
tively lower companies can produce for the domestic
market as well at lower cost and so more competitively,
because VAT is charged at the same rate on imported
goods and services as on domestic products. Finally,
demand in the economy as a whole would not be weak-
ened because the revenue from contributions would sim-
ply be replaced by tax revenue.
Even the price increases induced by higher VAT
would not cause problems because after contribution
rates were reduced persons in employment paying social
insurance contributions would have higher net incomes.
However, the net incomes of officials and the self-
employed would not directly change. The incomes of the
recipients of transfer payments (pensioners and the
unemployed) would react partly and after a timelag to
the improvement in net incomes to the employed. Alto-
gether mass incomes would thus rise. Unlike the strat-
egy of under-average wage rises pursued so far in Ger-
many this method would stabilise domestic demand,
increase international competitiveness and reduce the
costs of the factor labour, at one and the same time.
Fiscal policy: 
brake, but no more than planned
The difficult situation for the public budgets is mainly
due to the persistent economic stagnation. The revenues
to the public authorities have been much lower than
planned in recent years, moreover much more has had to
be spent on labour market policy measures than
expected. But the fiscal policy decision-makers have not
allowed these automatic stabilisers to develop their full
potential, they have responded to the cyclical need for
higher spending by cutting back on discretionary items
of expenditure to limit the growth in the state deficits.
This has particularly affected public investment, which
is still the most flexible type of expenditure, and with a
timelag state consumption, subsidies and social benefits.
Part of the tax reductions has been financed by cutbacks
in expenditure. In the end effect some of the expansion-
ary effects of the tax reduction policy have been consid-
erably reduced, so that the aim of keeping the deficit
ratio below the upper limit of 3% of nominal GDP laid
down in the Stability and Growth Pact could not be
achieved.
Yet once again it was clear that in a period of stagna-
tion, and certainly in a recession, fiscal policy is not in a
position to advance the consolidation of the public budg-
ets. Particularly in such a phase private demand is not
robust enough to withstand shocks from negative fiscal
policy in the form of expenditure cuts or higher charges;
further macroeconomic losses are inevitable.
A credible consolidation concept must therefore
always have the macroeconomic effects and repercus-
sions in view. Efforts to pursue a deficit target in isola-
tion will not be successful, because the deficits in the
public sector always _ automatically, one could say _
occur as a result of the surpluses in the other sectors. In
normal economic times it is mainly companies that bor-
row in order to invest in real assets. But from the year
2000 the corporate sector has not only been reducing its
indebtedness, companies have actually built up their
own surpluses. Any attempt by the state to reduce its
financing deficit in such a constellation will destabilise
the situation further, it will reduce value creation and
employment in the other sectors, and ultimately compa-
nies will have to respond with disinvestment, that is by
reducing stocks. An attempt at consolidation would be
successful if, at the same time, companies would invest
more and private households consume more. That is the
constellation in an upswing scenario. Or it could be
assumed that private households would respond to less
state spending by increasing their spending, because
they are expecting lower taxes and higher net incomes
in future. But what would cause them to expect taxes to
fall in the long term? It would be just as rational to see
the negative effect on demand from the fiscal policy
shock as just that and anticipate it.
Recent years have shown that it is not possible to
consolidate public finances in a period of stagnation; nor
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during the past year it has been possible to overcome
the persistent economic stagnation and the economy is
recovering _ however only at moderate speed. So far fis-
cal policy has refrained from intensifying its already
restrictive course with further programmes of cutbacks,
but many are demanding additional efforts at saving in
view of the targets in the Stability and Growth Pact.
They want to see the deficit brought down below the
3% limit as soon as possible.13 Against this it can be
argued that the success of consolidation measures very
decisively depends on whether the consolidation starts
at the 'right' time. The time is right when the economic
upswing has firmed.
Japan is a warning example of what the conse-
quences can be of starting to consolidate state finances
too early. In Japan the upswing was halted too soon sev-
eral times with fiscal policy measures, and the deficits
rose to a worrying level because the economy could not
gather pace. The United States is an example of the
opposite. The budget consolidation only started in 1994,
that is, two years after the end of the recession. It was
very successful because a sustained growth process had
started. The upswing was strong enough to enable the
high deficits to be reduced relatively without friction,
and surpluses were achieved. In the initial phase fiscal
policy supported the upswing, most importantly in com-
bination with an expansionary monetary policy. Great
Britain can point to similar success in economic policy.
And finally we can point to the upswing in the late 80s
in Germany, when again an expansive policy-mix ena-
bled an upswing to gather momentum, and as a conse-
quence the state achieved a budget surplus (in 1989).
If policy is not to risk losing public confidence it
should concentrate, in setting targets, on those aggre-
gates which it can directly control itself. DIW Berlin has
repeatedly pointed to the difficulties for policy if it ori-
ents to deficit targets _ in the form of deficit ratios. The
level of the deficits depends on the level of expenditures
and revenues. The latter largely depend on the economic
development in the short term. So in naming deficit
ratios policy is setting itself targets which it can only
conditionally reach with the instruments of revenue and
expenditure policy available to it. Failure to meet the
target is virtually preprogammed. That also applies if a
distinction is drawn between structural and cyclical def-
icits, particularly as the method of distribution between
the two components is difficult and not suitable for pol-
icy recommendations. Hence policy should focus more
on the expenditure side and set a binding expenditure
line.14 The line should be oriented to the trend in nomi-
nal GDP, and the interaction of the macroeconomic
development and state expenditure should be taken into
account. More investment in human capital, for exam-
ple, will improve the supply conditions in an economy
and increase its growth potential.
If the deficit15 is regarded as too high for policy an
expenditure line must be fixed that will remain lower
than the trend rate in nominal GDP beyond the cycle.
DIW Berlin has several times stated its preference for an
expenditure line slightly below the macroeconomic
trend. If state expenditure were to rise in the next few
years at a rate of 1.5% a year that would also be a rather
restrictive course _ the trend rate is clearly higher. But
policy would have greater scope for action than
assumed in this prognosis, in particular, public expendi-
ture on infrastructure and human capital could be
increased. This would also counter the danger of the
temptation to try and reduce the deficits too soon and
too much. The cost of such a strategy would be a
slightly slower reduction in the deficits; the gain would
be a positive effect on growth. Assuming a nominal rise
in GDP of 3% p.a., a nearly balanced state budget could
be expected in 2010. In 2006 the deficit would be below
3%. For the rest, in view of the development in recent
years the question arises whether the limits for borrow-
ing laid down in the Maastricht Treaty are based on the
assumption of too high growth rates, or whether eco-
nomic policy is not itself to blame for not fully exploit-
ing its scope for action.
The consolidation of the public budgets is linked to
the question of how efficient the tax system is and how
much it yields. There are repeated complaints of the
political difficulties in the way of attempting to reduce
tax concessions. But in the economic view there are sel-
dom reasons to maintain these privileges. Almost more
serious are the shortfalls from tax evasion, in particular
turnover tax fraud. It is estimated that this costs the
German fiscal authorities just under 18 billion euros a
year. That is roughly the entire revenue from corpora-
tion tax, or the yield from increasing VAT by two per-
centage points. That would in itself be a considerable
contribution to covering the change in social insurance
contribution financing proposed in the wage policy rec-
ommendations.
The latest measures by the Federal Government to
combat tax evasion are having only a limited effect. All
the more intensively should the efforts be continued to
13  The majority of the economic research institutes hold this view, cf.
'Evaluation of the Economic Situation', in: 'The German Economy hn
the Autumn of 2004', in: DIW Berlin Economic Bulletin, vol. 41, no. 11,
November 2004, http://www.diw.de/english/produkte/publikationen/
bulletin/docs/eb04/n04_11nov_2.html. 
14  This concept is described in more detail in 'Economic Trends 2004/
2005', loc. cit.
15  The expenditure target and the deficit target will only be equivalent
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change the turnover tax laws and move from the princi-
ple of tax owed to the principle of tax paid, both in the
incurrence of tax liability and in deductions from the
advance payments. Under the tax owed principle the
advance tax payment is already reimbursed when the
company has received the pre-product and not only
when it has paid the bill. The huge tax losses occur not
only when companies become insolvent but also, indeed
mainly, because sham or 'carousel' transactions are car-
ried out.16 
All in all the cyclical improvement and the transition
to a firmer upwards development offer fiscal policy the
chance to make notable advances in consolidating pub-
lic finances. Fiscal policy is in any case restrictive, and
for that reason it must be urged not to embark on
another programme of economising. That would be fatal
for the recovery process in the economy. On the con-
trary, investment in the infrastructure and in human
capital should be increased. 
16  For example, goods are channelled through the EU along a chain of
fictitious firms. A tax-free transaction within the EU is followed by a
domestic transaction that qualifies for deduction from the advance tax
payment. The fictitious firms are reimbursed for the advance tax with-
out themselves paying tax. Before the tax authorities can identify the
phoney transactions as such the fictitious firms have disappeared. 32 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 1/2005
Plea for a Sustainable Fiscal Policy1
Oswald Metzger, Distinguished Fellow, DIW Berlin
The Present Situation
The public budgets in Germany have slipped into structural
disequilibrium. In good and in poor economic times expendi-
ture has been generated and benefits promised with no
regard for whether they could be financed, and now they are
increasingly restricting the scope for action by the state.
Firstly, more and more of the burden of the massive expansion
of explicit state borrowing was pushed off into the future. Now
indebtedness has reached so high a level that new borrowing
no longer brings fiscal relief. New borrowing serves mainly to
pay the interest on old debts.
Secondly, in the last few decades there have been huge
increases in implicit borrowing. This is a result of the benefits
promised for public officials' pensions and in the statutory pen-
sion, health and care insurance systems. As these have to be
financed from the value being created by the actively earning
generation, the demographic change means that these prom-
ises are simply handing out masses of blank cheques that are
not covered. The full effect will only felt by the social insurance
systems from 2010, when the people in the high birth rate
years begin to leave working life.
Not without reason did the Council of Experts in its Report of
Autumn 2003 add to the figure of 1300 billion euros for explicit
indebtedness implicit indebtedness of 5700 billion euros. This
makes Germany's true level of borrowing well over three times
the annual output of our economy. We are sinning against
future generations because we are fritttering away their scope
for action now.
That the fatal shifting of the load in past decades is already
affecting us is evident from the structural analysis of the Fed-
eral budget (cf. figure 1). The expenditure on pensions, main-
tenance and interest is accounting for an ever greater share.
From 2010 demographic change will cause a further rise. The
slight fall next year is only an accounting technicality. It is the
result of the balance sheet contraction for post office pen-
sions. The sale of claims will mean lower expenditure in 2005,
but in return the Federal Government has agreed to waive rev-
enues from the successor enterprises to the post office for
decades, although so far they have provided about one third of
the funds needed for their 'post pensioners'. In future the Fed-
eral Government will be solely responsible for these pay-
ments, and this is a prime example of non-sustainable fiscal
policy.
It is also evident in the effect of the high German labour costs
in destroying jobs, costs that any employee can read off from
the gap that has been widening for decades between his
gross and his net earnings. The gap was already widening
steadily in the old Federal Republic. The mistake of financing
reunification through the social insurance systems increased
the tempo dramatically. A fatal consequence of the high labour
costs is significant under-employment among the low skilled.
This is increased by insufficient wage differentials in the col-
lective agreements and it is flanked with excessive social
transfers by the state to persons capable of working.
The consequences of this structural unemployment in turn
affect the public budgets. The Federal grant to the Federal
Employment Agency and the unemployment assistance,
which is financed out of tax revenue (until end-2004) correlate
with the level of unemployment. The municipal authorities
responsible for paying social assistance are groaning under
the burden, which is expanding at an alarming rate owing to
the high level of structural unemployment. And for many years
consumption expenditure has been displacing investment in
the fixed assets and human capital stock of our economy.
Infrastructure tasks, and education and research, are under-
funded. How strongly the share of social expenditure in Fed-
eral tax revenues has risen in the last thirteen years, for exam-
ple, can be seen in figure 2. The extreme rise in the share of
the statutory pension insurance financed from tax revenue is
particularly striking.




1 (2004: debit side supplement; 2005: debit side after Budget Committee; 2006 to
2008: Financial Plan).
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General framework conditions
A fiscal policy that is sustainable over the long term must
achieve surpluses in good economic times so that the auto-
matic stabilisers can work in the recession without immedi-
ately driving up the public deficit, which is against the aims of
the European Stability and Growth Pact. The brake on borrow-
ing in the Constitution (Art. 115) has been unable to combat
state indebtedness. In the past this limit for borrowing has
repeatedly been ignored, and it is happening again now. I
want to see a ban on borrowing laid down in the Constitution,
with only one exception permitted. In a recession cyclical rev-
enue shortfalls and extra expenditure for the labour market
can be financed with overdraft loans, but these must be paid
back by the end of the cycle. An alternative would be the
method suggested by DIW Berlin, to fix a line for expenditure
in a budget law covering several years.
All public budgets are in a tight corset of rising expenditure on
interest payments, pensions and social benefits. Owing to the
demographic development and structural unemployment this
expenditure will grow in future at a stronger rate than nominal
GDP. Hence an expenditure line designed for the consolida-
tion of all the public budgets, and which is set at half the level
of nominal GDP, for example, could never be maintained with-
out structural reforms to the labour market, the public service
legislation (officials' pensions, supplementary pensions for
blue and white collar workers, de facto jobs for life in the public
service) and the social insurance systems.
Permanent public officials
Unless they cease to be responsible for the permanent public
officials the Länder will face expenditure on pensions rising at
an above-average rate. Expenditure per pensioner is rising
strongly because a growing number of officials from the senior
ranks are retiring, while the number employed in the lower and
middle ranks is falling strongly. Growing costs for health care
also affect the public budgets indirectly through the status of
officials, because in the case of actively employed officials the
supplementary benefit covers half the sickness costs and is
financed from tax revenue – for pensioners as much as 70%.
As this will not be sufficient the pension reforms must be
applied to officials as well.
Pensions insurance
Longer life expectancy and the tendency to work less and less
have direct repercussions on the public budgets. Pensioners
pay less tax and they also require additional benefits. For that
reason the structural rise in expenditure in the Federal budget
for the grant to the statutory pensions insurance can only be
reduced by gradually raising the retirement age for receipt of a
statutory pension to 67 from the next decade, and adjusting
the deductions for early retirement to 0.5% to 0.6% per month,
the correct figure by actuarial calculation.
Health insurance
The ageing of the population and medical progress are caus-
ing rising health care costs. Health care is one of the growth
markets of the future and it should be run on market economy
lines, with competition. The principle of payment per item and
service must be replaced by the principle of cost reimburse-
ment. Cost transparency will make the system more efficient.
If health costs continue to rise in the long term despite all the
cost efficiency, and if this is not to cause further structural
rises in the cost of the factor labour, the costs of health care
must in future be uncoupled from labour costs. That is only
possible with a personal premium system in which every adult
is insured. Social compensation for children and people
whose income is below the acceptable relative threshold for
charges must come from tax revenue. That is not only socially
more fair, because unlike the present system those who can
afford more will be paying more towards social compensation
in health care – it will also help the labour market because its
cost burden will fall.
Care insurance
Care insurance has reduced solidarity within our society. The
costs are being socialised and inheritances spared. The con-
tinued trend to single households will in the medium and long
term lead to a clear rise in the number of single persons need-
ing stationary care. The cost pressure in care insurance is
heavier than in any other branch of social insurance, and it will
enforce contribution rates of around 5% in the next twenty
years. This is systematically making labour more expensive.
We must tackle changing the system of care insurance and
move to an obligatory insurance system with capital cover.
Many persons now receiving care allowances have made no
or very little contribution themselves, so they have not
acquired rights of any size and it is still possible to change the
system.
Figure 19
Social Expenditure in Relation to 
Federal Tax Revenues
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University tuition fees
The time spent at university in Germany is too long compared 
with the European average (nearly one and a half years 
longer).  University tuition fees are a proven means of improv-
ing the quality of education and training and reducing the time 
spent at university, because they are so designed that social 
background does not constitute a barrier to access. Certainly 
the present absence of tuition fees in Germany has not 
brought an above-average percentage of students from the 
lower income groups into the universities, on the contrary, 
countries that charge university tuition fees have greater per-
meability for gifted young people from low income families 
than Germany, where no tuition fees are charged, largely for 
social policy reasons. Tuition fees can also make a structural 
contribution in that graduates will enter working life sooner, 
and this will increase the volume of labour in a life cycle.
The labour market
All these social insurance reforms will work structurally to pre-
vent an increase in labour costs for demographic reasons, and
so they will tend to strengthen growth and employment. In
order to make the labour market more flexible, however, fur-
ther cautious relaxing of the strict rules on protection against
dismissal could be tackled. Although we have very stringent
regulations against dismissal, both in legislation and in collec-
tive wage agreements, Germany has clearly fewer people
over 55 still working than other countries. To find a 'socially
acceptable' way of evading the protective legislation compa-
nies and trade unions have, in many cases, made agreements
at the expense of third parties, specifically unemployment and
pensions insurance. The practice of paying off older workers
has hugely increased the labour and social costs in our econ-
omy.
The revenue side of a sustainable fiscal strategy
A sustainable fiscal policy requires appropriate state finance
from tax revenue. The tax ratio in the economy as a whole,
which was between 23% and 24% of GDP in Germany for
decades, has fallen markedly in recent years. Tax conces-
sions, half-hearted tax reforms and the greater opportunities
internationalisation offers for constructing a favourable tax
position have undermined the assessment thresholds for
direct taxation, and they are also affecting value added tax.
Structural reforms are still urgently needed; the Red-Green
tax reforms were only the beginning.
In direct taxation the concern is still to spread the burden on
incomes more equally. Tax concessions and other exemptions
must be ended, as must the failure to collect taxes due from
companies and on capital income. In return the high rates on
incomes and profits could be reduced, which will reduce the
incentive to exploit tax loopholes and improve Germany's
position as a business location.1 Trading tax should be put on
a broader basis like a value creation tax, as part of fundamen-
tal reform of municipal finance, or integrated into income and
corporation tax.2 Asset-related taxes, which are low in Ger-
many by international comparison, would be most suitable for
increases. Municipal land and buildings tax and inheritance
tax could be named, for their assessment bases need urgent
reform. Reintroducing net worth tax, on the other hand, would
not be a meaningful alternative, as it is very cost-intensive to
collect and the constant 'taxation of the substance' of compa-
nies or financial assets raises many questions in tax policy
and economy policy.3
Indirect taxation of consumption should also be increased at
the expense of direct taxation. VAT fraud is evidently proliferat-
ing and needs to be stopped. Increasing VAT should not be
taboo, if the social compensation needed to finance a compe-
tition-oriented health care system, that will uncouple health
care costs from labour costs, has to be paid for out of tax rev-
enue. Ecological tax reform is better than its reputation, but it
still needs improving. The tax rates should be oriented more to
environmental policy objectives and the general tax reduction
for industry reduced further.
Epilogue
Experience has shown that shifting the load into the future is
still the easiest route for fiscal policy. But it is unrealistic to
hope for better times economically to make consolidation eas-
ier. The year 2000 showed that even real growth of nearly 3%
seduces politicians into tax concessions (increasing the global
commuters' allowance) and can completely block the willing-
ness to reform (the gentle hand policy). If the structural faults
in our social insurance system, in public service law and the
cartelised labour market are not tackled the public budgets
cannot be consolidated sustainably in growth periods either.
That is my experience from eight years of Federal budget pol-
icy – as speaker on budget policy both in the Opposition and
in the Government.
I have kept the very simple request for more cost transparency
from the state to the last. We need a commercial accounting
system in the public sector as well. This would entail making
provision for future pension payments to officials, for example,
which would show the true costs. Other inefficiencies in the
state would also be revealed – as taxpayers we have been
paying for these. No efficiency without cost transparency –
that principle applies to many reform building blocks in our
economy.
1   Stefan Bach, Peter Haan, Hans-Joachim Rudolph and Viktor Steiner:
'Reformkonzepte zur Einkommens- und Ertragsbesteuerung: Erhebli-
che Aufkommens- und Verteilungswirkungen, aber relativ geringe
Effekte auf das Aurbeitsangebot', in: DIW Berlin Wochenbericht,
no. 16/2004 (http:www.diw.de/deutsche/produkte/publikationen/
wochenberichte/doos/04-16.pdf).
2    Stefan Bach and Dieter Vesper: 'A Crisis in Finance and Investment
– Local Government Finance Needs Fundamental Reform', DIW Berlin
Economic Bulletin, vol. 39, no. 9, September 2002.
3   Stefan Bach, Peter Haan, Ralf Maiterth and Caren Sureth: 'Modelle
für die Vermögenbesteuerung von natürlichen Personen und Kapitalge-
sellschaften – Konzepte, Aufkommen, wirtschaftliche Wirkungen', in:
DIW Berlin: Politikberatung kompakt 1 (http://www.diw.de.deutsch/
produkte/publikationen/diwkompakt/docs/diwkompakt_2004-001.pdf).
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Appendix 1
Federal Republic of Germany
Key National Accounts Data – Estimate and Forecast for 2004 to 2005
2003 2004 2005
2004 2005
1st half 2nd half 1st half 2nd half
1. Components of GDP
Change (%) on the previous year
Employed labour force (domestic) –1.0 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.7
Working hours 0.1 –0.6 0.5 –0.2 –1.1 0.0 1.0
Working days 0.1 1.5 –0.7 1.4 1.7 –0.1 –1.2
Labour volume (by calendar month)1 –0.8 1.0 0.4 1.2 0.9 0.3 0.4
Productivity2 0.7 0.7 1.4 0.5 0.9 1.1 1.6
Gross domestic product at 1995 prices –0.1 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.5 2.0
2. GDP by type of expenditure at current prices
a) Euro billion
Private consumption3 1 255.3 1 272.5 1 300.2 622.4 650.1 635.1 665.1
Government consumption 408.5 405.0 408.7 194.0 211.1 195.1 213.6
Fixed capital formation 379.8 379.3 389.1 179.4 199.9 183.8 205.3
Machinery, equipment and other 171.5 172.9 184.5 80.4 92.5 86.2 98.3
Construction 208.3 206.4 204.7 99.0 107.4 97.6 107.1
Change in stocks4 –7.6 17.6 25.9 11.0 6.7 29.3 –3.4
Domestic demand 2 036.0 2 074.4 2 123.9 1 006.7 1 067.7 1 043.3 1 080.6
Net exports 92.2 114.2 128.6 64.1 50.1 59.3 69.3
Exports 769.3 840.3 897.3 412.5 427.7 435.2 462.1
Imports 677.1 726.1 768.8 348.5 377.6 375.9 392.9
Gross domestic product 2 128.2 2 188.6 2 252.5 1 070.8 1 117.8 1 102.6 1 149.9
b) Change (%) on the previous year
Private consumption3  1.1  1.4  2.2  1.0  1.7  2.0  2.3
Government consumption  0.8 –0.9  0.9 –0.2 –1.4  0.6  1.2
Fixed capital formation –3.1 –0.1  2.6 –0.7  0.4  2.5  2.7
Machinery, equipment and other –2.8  0.8  6.7 –1.8  3.3  7.2  6.3
Construction –3.3 –0.9 –0.8  0.2 –2.0 –1.4 –0.3
Domestic demand  1.2  1.9  2.4  0.6  3.1  3.6  1.2
Exports  1.0  9.2  6.8  9.2  9.3  5.5  8.0
Imports  1.5  7.2  5.9  3.3  11.1  7.9  4.0
Gross domestic product  1.0  2.8  2.9  2.9  2.8  3.0  2.9
3. GDP by type of expenditure at 1995 prices
a) Euro billion
Private consumption3 1 132.5 1 128.9 1 138.9 554.2 574.7 557.4 581.5
Government consumption 390.2 388.5 389.2 192.0 196.4 191.9 197.3
Fixed capital formation 389.1 388.0 395.7 183.2 204.8 187.1 208.6
Machinery, equipment and other 179.0 182.5 194.2 84.4 98.1 90.9 103.3
Construction 210.1 205.5 201.5 98.8 106.7 96.2 105.3
Change in stocks4 –18.1 4.9 9.1 2.8 2.1 14.6 –5.5
Domestic demand 1 893.7 1 910.3 1 932.8 932.3 978.0 951.0 981.8
Net exports 91.5 109.9 122.9 60.6 49.3 56.4 66.5
Exports 740.0 809.5 855.5 397.6 411.9 416.5 439.1
Imports 648.5 699.6 732.7 336.9 362.6 360.0 372.6
Gross domestic product 1 985.2 2 020.1 2 055.7 992.9 1 027.2 1 007.4 1 048.3
b) Change (%) on the previous year
Private consumption3  0.0 –0.3  0.9 –0.5 –0.1  0.6  1.2
Government consumption  0.1 –0.4  0.2  0.1 –1.0  0.0  0.4
Fixed capital formation –2.2 –0.3  2.0 –0.6  0.0  2.1  1.9
Machinery, equipment and other –0.9  2.0  6.4 –0.6  4.3  7.7  5.3
Construction –3.2 –2.2 –2.0 –0.6 –3.6 –2.7 –1.3
Domestic demand  0.5  0.9  1.2 –0.2  1.9  2.0  0.4
Exports  1.8  9.4  5.7  10.0  8.8  4.8  6.6
Imports  4.0  7.9  4.7  5.5  10.1  6.9  2.8
Gross domestic product –0.1  1.8  1.8  1.7  1.8  1.5  2.036 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 1/2005
Appendix 1 (contd)
Federal Republic of Germany
Key National Accounts Data – Estimate and Forecast for 2004 to 2005
2003 2004 2005
2004 2005
1st half 2nd half 1st half 2nd half
4. GDP by type of expenditure: price level of domestic demand (1995 = 100)
b) Change (%) on the previous year
Private consumption3 1.0 1.7 1.3 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.1
Government consumption 0.7 –0.4 0.7 –0.3 –0.5 0.6 0.8
Fixed capital formation –0.9 0.2 0.6 –0.1 0.4 0.3 0.8
Machinery, equipment and other –1.9 –1.1 0.2 –1.2 –1.0 –0.5 0.9
Construction –0.1 1.3 1.2 0.9 1.7 1.3 1.0
Exports –0.8 –0.1 1.0 –0.8 0.4 0.7 1.4
Imports –2.4 –0.6 1.1 –2.1 0.9 1.0 1.2
Gross domestic product 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.5 0.8
5. Origin and distribution of income
a) Euro billion
Compensation of employees 1 132.2 1 132.2 1 141.7 538.0 594.2 540.6 601.1
Wages and salaries, gross 909.8 910.3 922.2 431.0 479.3 434.8 487.4
Wages and salaries, net 590.5 601.3 611.6 281.1 320.1 283.8 327.8
Entrepreneurial and property income, gross 437.1 492.1 532.8 249.4 242.7 270.2 262.6
National income 1 569.3 1 624.3 1 674.5 787.4 836.9 810.8 863.7
Depreciation 318.3 322.3 328.3 161.0 161.3 163.6 164.6
Indirect taxes minus subsidies 226.7 230.3 237.9 114.6 115.7 118.7 119.2
Gross national income 2 114.2 2 176.9 2 240.6 1 063.0 1 113.9 1 093.1 1 147.5
b) Change (%) on the previous year
Compensation of employees 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.1 –0.1 0.5 1.2
Wages and salaries, gross –0.2 0.1 1.3 0.3 –0.1 0.9 1.7
Wages and salaries, net –0.8 1.8 1.7 1.9 1.8 0.9 2.4
Wages and salaries, gross per employee 1.2 0.3 0.9 0.7 –0.1 0.7 1.1
Wages and salaries, net per employee 0.5 2.0 1.4 2.3 1.8 0.8 1.9
Entrepreneurial and property income, gross  3.5  12.6  8.3  13.5  11.7  8.4  8.2
National income  1.1  3.5  3.1  4.0  3.1  3.0  3.2
Depreciation  0.5  1.3  1.8  1.1  1.4  1.6  2.1
Indirect taxes minus subsidies 3.2 1.6 3.3 1.3 1.9 3.5 3.0
Gross national income 1.2 3.0 2.9 3.2 2.7 2.8 3.0
6. Private households' incomes and expenditure
a) Euro billion
Mass income 964.4 976.1 982.8 468.7 507.4 469.9 512.9
Wages and salaries, net 590.5 601.3 611.6 281.1 320.1 283.8 327.8
Monetary social benefits 450.8 455.5 453.3 228.0 227.5 227.2 226.1
Minus: charges on social benefits5 76.9 80.6 82.0 40.4 40.2 41.0 41.0
Other primary income6 460.8 468.6 488.1 249.5 219.1 260.6 227.5
Other transfers received, net7 –35.4 –35.2 –33.1 –17.1 –18.1 –16.0 –17.1
Disposable income8 1 389.8 1 409.5 1 437.9 701.1 708.4 714.5 723.4
Memo item: increase in claims 
on company pension schemes 16.6 18.4 20.4 8.9 9.6 9.9 10.6
Private consumption3 1 255.3 1 272.5 1 300.2 622.4 650.1 635.1 665.1
Current savings 151.1 155.5 158.1 87.5 67.9 89.2 68.8
Savings ratio9 10.7 10.9 10.8 12.3 9.5 12.3 9.4
b) Change (%) on the previous year
Mass income  0.5  1.2  0.7  1.3  1.1  0.3  1.1
Wages and salaries, net –0.8  1.8  1.7  1.9  1.8  0.9  2.4
Monetary social benefits  2.6  1.0 –0.5  1.3  0.8 –0.4 –0.6
Minus: charges on social benefits5  2.4  4.9  1.7  5.8  4.0  1.5  2.0
Other primary income6  1.0  1.7  4.2  0.7  2.9  4.5  3.8
Disposable income8 1.2 1.4 2.0 1.0 1.8 1.9 2.1
Private consumption3 1.1 1.4 2.2 1.0 1.7 2.0 2.3
Current savings 3.3 2.9 1.7 2.5 3.4 1.9 1.3DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 1/2005 37
Appendix 1 (contd)
Federal Republic of Germany
Key National Accounts Data – Estimate and Forecast for 2004 to 2005
2003 2004 2005
2004 2005
1st half 2nd half 1st half 2nd half
7. Government revenue and expenditure10
a) Euro billion
Revenue
Taxes 481.6 480.9 489.2 236.5 244.4 241.1 248.1
Social contributions 394.8 396.4 399.4 192.5 203.9 193.0 206.4
Property income 15.0 10.8 10.8 5.0 5.8 5.2 5.6
Other current transfers11 66.1 66.3 66.7 31.2 35.1 31.2 35.5
Total revenue 957.5 954.3 966.1 465.1 489.2 470.4 495.7
Expenditure
Inputs12 251.3 249.0 250.8 119.5 129.4 120.4 130.4
Compensation of employees 167.9 166.8 168.1 78.1 88.7 78.6 89.5
Property income, transferred 66.7 67.6 68.9 32.8 34.8 33.4 35.5
Subsidies 28.9 28.0 26.9 13.4 14.6 12.8 14.1
Social benefits 419.8 424.3 421.4 212.2 212.1 211.7 209.8
Private households 415.2 419.5 416.6 209.8 209.7 209.2 207.4
Rest of the world 4.6 4.8 4.9 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4
Other current transfers 38.2 37.8 38.3 17.9 19.9 18.1 20.3
Capital transfers 35.6 34.4 32.7 19.1 15.4 18.0 14.7
Gross investment 31.9 30.5 29.9 13.4 17.2 13.0 16.9
Net increase in non-produced capital goods13 –1.4 –1.5 –1.4 –0.7 –0.8 –0.7 –0.8
Total expenditure 1 038.9 1 037.0 1 035.6 505.7 531.3 505.3 530.3
Deficit/surplus –81.3 –82.7 –69.5 –40.6 –42.2 –34.8 –34.7
b) Change (%) on the previous year
Revenue
Taxes  0.8 –0.1  1.7  0.3 –0.6  2.0  1.5
Social contributions  1.4  0.4  0.8  0.1  0.6  0.3  1.3
Property income –13.9 –28.5  0.4 –48.3  6.6  4.8 –3.4
Other current transfers11  1.0  0.3  0.6 –1.6  2.0 –0.1  1.2
Total revenue  0.8 –0.3  1.2 –0.9  0.2  1.1  1.3
Expenditure
Inputs12 1.3 –0.9 0.8 –0.6 –1.2 0.7 0.8
Compensation of employees 0.0 –0.7 0.8 –0.1 –1.2 0.6 1.0
Property income, transferred 1.1 1.4 1.8 –1.5 4.3 1.9 1.8
Subsidies –6.3 –3.2 –3.9 –3.0 –3.5 –4.4 –3.5
Social benefits 2.5 1.1 –0.7 1.3 0.8 –0.2 –1.1
Private households 2.6 1.0 –0.7 1.3 0.8 –0.3 –1.1
Rest of the world –3.9 4.1 0.6 4.7 3.5 0.4 0.8
Other current transfers 7.4 –1.0 1.4 –3.8 1.7 1.1 1.7
Capital transfers 2.8 –3.4 –5.0 –3.7 –2.9 –5.7 –4.2
Gross investment –11.2 –4.2 –2.3 –4.6 –3.9 –2.9 –1.7
Net increase in non-produced capital goods13              –              –              –              –              –              –              –
Total expenditure  1.1 –0.2 –0.1 –0.2 –0.1 –0.1 –0.2
1 Calculations by the Institute for Research on Employment and by the DIW Berlin. — 2 Gross domestic product at 1995 prices per hour worked. — 3 Incl. private non-profit
organisations. — 4 Incl. net increase in value. — 5 Incl. consumption-related taxes. — 6 Self-employed income/operating profits plus property income received minus property
income losses. — 7 Transfers received minus other transfers. — 8 Expenditure concept. — 9 Savings as a percentage of disposable income. — 10 Federal, state and local gov-
ernment and social security funds. — 11 Other current transfers. Capital transfers. Sales and other subsidies. — 12 Incl. social benefits in kind and other production charges. —
13 Incl. one-off receipts from the sale of UMTS licences.
Sources: Federal Statistical Office (Series 18 of the National Accounts); DIW Berlin calculations.38 DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 1/2005DIW Berlin Weekly Report No. 1/2005 39
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